Restoring Trust after Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter?

By David B. Farber. 2004

1,261 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2c180f973a1d54c7f61eadb289d529abf1d2855d

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Citations in the corpus

Strengthening the Financial Reporting System: Can Audit Committees Deliver? (2010, positive): “Specifically, researchers have used the cost of equity and debt financing as measured respectively by stock returns (Farber, 2005) and yield spreads (Anderson et al.”
Earnings Restatements, Changes in CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance (2008, background): “This paper also complements studies investigating other monitoring changes in response to financial reporting failures (e.g., Farber 2005; Srinivasan 2005; Desai et al. 2006).”
Meta-analysis and the Accounting Literature: The Case of Audit Committee Independence and Financial Reporting Quality (2007, neutral): “1 Klein Yes (2002) 692 firm-years Abnormal accruals % INDAC Chi-square Negative significant 2 Xie et al.”
Director Interlocks and Spillover Effects of Reputational Penalties From Financial Reporting Fraud (2008, background): “I focus on the following governance structures that have been examined in prior studies for their effects on financial reporting fraud: independence of board chair, directors’ independence, directors’ ownership, and institutional ownership (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Beasley, 1996; DeChow et al., 1996;”
Performance, Growth and Earnings Management (2006, background): “41 Farber, D. (2005). “Restoring Trust After Fraud: Does Corporate Governance Matter?” Forthcoming in The Accounting Review.”
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview (2006, background): “However, focusing on a more recent time period, Farber (2005) finds that firms charged with fraud by the SEC tend to have poor governance relative to a control group, and that the average governance of the fraud firms improves during the following three years.”
Using Nonfinancial Measures to Assess Fraud Risk (2009, background): “…and Sweeney 1998; Lee et al. 1999), corporate governance variables (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Abbott et al. 2000; Beasley et al. 2000; Farber 2005), suspicious accounting (Marquardt and Wiedman 2004; McVay 2006) and other fraud indicators such as weak internal controls (Bell and…”
Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings? (2010, background): “A number of papers predict that accounting restatements will be positively associated with poor governance and find support for this prediction (Farber, 2005; Beasley, 1996; Peng and Röell, 2008; Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2006).”
Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, positive): “Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney (1996) and Farber (2005) find that firms that fraudulently manipulate earnings have lower outside blockholdings.”
Business Strategy, Financial Reporting Irregularities, and Audit Effort (2013, methodology): “However, Farber (2005) finds no difference in the level of institutional investors for samples of fraud and non-fraud firms; thus, we make no prediction for the coefficient on DED IO.14 To control for potential firm, industry, and time fixed effects in our panel data, we include year and industry…”