The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States

By Clifford G. Holderness. 2009

615 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2b392340af26154f5ea727a2eb150e917c231a16

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Citations in the corpus

Do Family Firms Use Dividend Policy as a Governance Mechanism? Evidence from the Euro Zone (2012, background): “Examining the effects of family control on specific corporate dimensions is a matter of considerable importance because family firms account for a large percentage of the corporate sector in most geographical regions around the world (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Holderness”
Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, positive): “While Holderness (2009) reports that 96% of US firms feature a shareholder who owns at least 5%, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer (1999) note that only 20% (10”
Ownership concentration and corporate performance from a dynamic perspective: Does national governance quality matter? (2015, methodology): “As a consequence, different types of ownership concentration may have different motivations and capabilities which, in turn, have different impacts on firm performance (Holderness, 2009).”
Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance and Its Effects on Performance: A Case of Selected Banks in Kenya (2011, background): “It can be assumed that better overlap between ownership and control should indeed lead to a reduction in conflicts of interest therefore higher firm value (Holderness, 2009).”
Exit as Governance: An Empirical Analysis (2010, positive): “We define Russian and Asian as indicator variables to denote the Russian default crisis (10)This result is consistent with Holderness (2009) who argues that ownership patterns in the U.S. are not as diffuse as commonly believed. (11)Our hand-collection procedure for 2002 yielded fewer observations t”
Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, positive): “This is because 1995 is the approximate date of the international databases on block ownership used in Holderness (2009) to permit an international comparison.”
Global corporate governance: On the relevance of firms’ ownership structure (2016, background): “(Holderness, 2009), continental European (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) and Eastern Asian firms (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000).”
Investor Horizons and Corporate Policies (2013, neutral): “Since Holderness (2009) finds that virtually all firms have at least one blockholder, what we measure as firms with greater long-term investor ownership may actually be firms with greater blockholder ownership.”