Corporate Governance Myths: Comments on Armstrong, Guay, and Weber

By James A. Brickley, J. Zimmerman. 2010

282 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2943502b112d141e419737e89f65040d09150909

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Rodrigo S. Verdi
2. W. Guay
3. Christopher S. Armstrong
4. Nemit Shroff
5. Martin Walker
6. Christian Leuz
7. Joseph P. Weber
8. Katherine Schipper

In Strategy and Management

1. Rodrigo S. Verdi
2. W. Guay
3. Christopher S. Armstrong
4. Katherine Schipper
5. Nemit Shroff
6. Per Olsson
7. Joseph P. Weber
8. Jennifer Francis

Citations in the corpus

• Board Expertise: Do Directors from Related Industries Help Bridge the Information Gap? (2014, unknown): “These two roles for directors are not, however, distinct; they can be performed simultaneously and are complementary (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2007; Brickley and Zimmerman 2010).”
• Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial Misreporting (2012, unknown): “…the results.10 The analysis is on a small sample and uses crude proxies for monitoring that may or may not capture the sorts of governance mechanisms that would detect and prevent misstatements (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007; Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010; Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010).”
• Estimation sample selection for discretionary accruals models (2013, background): “The problem we address is significant in the U.S. and acute in non-U.”
• Globalizing the Boardroom - The Effects of Foreign Directors on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (2012, background): “…Boards can perform their monitoring and advising functions simultaneously for certain firm decisions such as capital budgeting and payout policies (Brickley and Zimmerman (2010)), while for other decisions such as executive compensation, financial reporting, and CEO retention/dismissal, boards…”
• Professors in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Professors in the Boardroom (2014, unknown): “More recent literature has begun to emphasize the importance of the advising role, not merely the monitoring role that outside directors play (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010).”
• The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review (2019, background): “2 See also Core (2001), Dye (2001), Magee (2001), Sloan (2001), and Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) for discussions of these literatures.”
• Revisiting Agency Theory: Evidence of Board Independence and Agency Cost from Bangladesh (2015, background): “This independent board may independently monitor and advise managers, which may promote the shareholders’ interest (Brickley and Zimmerman 2010).”
• The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “(However, see Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010, for further cautionary discussion about potential problems with relying on even this type of conditional benchmarking.)”