Empirical tests of budget ratcheting and its effect on managers' discretionary accrual choices

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Organizational Learning in Target Setting (2017, background): “Prior research on target setting has taken a static view (Bouwens & Kroos, 2011; Leone & Rock, 2002), implicitly assuming that organizations are in a stable situation and that whenever a new unit opens, it instantaneously reaches an equilibrium.”
Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts (2011, unknown): “…with high growth opportunities are more likely to adopt external standards (such as peer performance) in setting executive pay since internal standards provide managers of high growth firms stronger incentives to smooth performance in response to fears of budget ratcheting (Leone and Rock 2002).”
Executive target bonuses and what they imply about performance standards (2002, background): “In a single-firm study of budget targets, Leone and Rock (2002) conclude that firms ratchet managers' budget targets upward following superior past performance, thus motivating high-performing managers to consciously reduce their reported performance.”