The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence

By Michael C. Jensen. 2003

283 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Human capital matters: Market valuation of firm investments in training and the role of complementary assets (2017, background): “Corporate control events typically generate high returns, typically around 30%, for firms being acquired but little or nothing for acquiring firms (Jensen, 1986).”
Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There (2013, background): “The result is a familiar and predictable “budget game” that ultimately in which parties that ultimately destroys the information critical to coordinating the disparate activities of a large complex organization (Jensen (2003)).”
Business groups and their types (2007, background): “In these bank-centered business groups, cross shareholdings among firms prevent external investors from disciplining managers through a takeover ( Jensen, 1988 ).”
The Implications of Long-Term Performance Plans and Institutional Ownership for Firms' Research and Development (R&D) Investments (2001, methodology): “In the second stage, the least squares method is applied where the predicted values for the endogenous regressors from first stage regressions are used as explanatory variables (see for example, Kmenta [1986]).”
Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity (2005, unknown): “C E N T E R F O R P U B L I C L E A D E R S H I P of free cash flow that I called attention to in my paper of that title (Jensen, 1986a).”