Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics

By Rui A. Albuquerque, Hugo A. Hopenhayn. 2004

599 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/279e5161b6c936f3638b9c561991bc4f57806dcb

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Citations in the corpus

Multiple-Product Firms and Product Switching (2010, background): “See, for example, Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2002), Baily et al.”
Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs (2009, result): “Borrowing constraints have been considered in several recent papers (Gomes 2001, Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 2002, Clementi and Hopenhayn 2002) and is consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) an”
Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment (2012, background): “Our analysis is also directly related to other analyses of agency, dynamic contracting and investment, e.g., Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Quadrini (2004) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2005).”
Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang (2007, unknown): “This result is a major feature of the models of Thomas and Worrall (1994) and Alburquerque and Hopenhayn (2004).”
Collateral, Risk Management, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity (2010, background): “Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) and Hopenhayn and Werning (2007) analyze the implications for dynamic firm financing 24Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) recognize the importance of intertemporal trade-offs for risk management without formally addressing them.”
Optimal Long-Term Financial Contracting (2007, background): “Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004); Quadrini (2004); Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) consider dynamic models in which the scale of the business is determined as part of the optimal contract.”
Collateral, Taxes, and Leverage (2016, unknown): “The first is a set of theoretical papers 2 that uses limited commitment models such as ours to study subjects such as international trade 3 contracts (Thomas and Worrall 1994), financial constraints (Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 2004), 4 macroeconomic dynamics (Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini 2004; Jerma”
Credit Constraints in Education (2011, unknown): “Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 2004, Monge-Naranjo 2009). We assume punishments for default that are similar to those in Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) and Chatterjee, et al. (2007) in their analyses of bankruptcy. (28)Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) empirically support this form of response by pri”
Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics (2003, unknown): “Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2001), Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2001) and Quintin (2001) study related cash diversion models but assume that the firm's cash flow is publicly observed.”
Firm Age and the Evolution of Borrowing Costs: Evidence from Japanese Small Firms (2010, background): “[2] Albuquerque, Rui, and Hugo Hopenhayn (2002), “Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics,” Rochester Center of Economic Research Working Paper No.”
Inefficient Credit Booms (2007, background): “planner problem. To clarify the role of the pecuniary externality, in 3 .3 I first present a very basic case”