Recent developments in the theory of regulation
By Mark Armstrong, D. E. Sappington. 2007
490 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/63a4c86c4bf51d2fd20c77137842cd9636af5964
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Lars A. Stole
- P. Joskow
- Daniel Montolio
- Néstor Duch
- Francesc Trillas
- Mark Armstrong
- Carlo Cambini
- Laura Rondi
In Management Science and Operations Research
- P. Joskow
- Daniel Montolio
- Néstor Duch
- Francesc Trillas
- Mark Armstrong
- Carlo Cambini
- D. E. Sappington
- Laura Rondi
Citations in the corpus
- Platform Rules: Multi-Sided Platforms as Regulators (2008, unknown): “…include regulating entry (often when the public controls a scarce resource, such as radio spectrum), regulating price schedules to customers, setting simple quality and service standards and imposing non-discriminatory trade practices (Kahn 1988; Laffont and Tirole 1993; Armstrong 2007).”
- Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D (2015, unknown): “Finally, methodologically and conceptually, the paper is related to a broad literature in industrial organization that assesses the impact of switching costs and incumbent advantages on market outcomes in a variety of settings (Farrell and Klemperer 2007 provides a survey), as well as the vast liter”
- Regulation, Competition and Liberalization (2005, background): “Given the prohibitive cost of constructing multiple infrastructures, rival retail operators often are compelled to procure key inputs (e.g., network access) from the incumbent, verticallyintegrated supplier.”
- Regulation of Natural Monopoly (2007, background): “Armstrong and Sappington (2003a, 2003b) advance this analysis by considering cases where the regulated firm is uncertain about the operating costs that will be realized but knows that it can reduce costs by increasing managerial effort, though in a way that creates a moral hazard problem but no…”
- Regulation of Natural Monopolies (2005, unknown): “Armstrong and Sappington (2003) articulate this by specifying an objective function W = S + αR where W is expected social welfare, S equals expected consumers’ (including consumers as taxpayers) surplus, R equals the expected rents earned by the owners and managers of the firm (over and above what…”
- Regulating Infrastructure: The Impact on Risk and Investment (2006, unknown): “The standard textbook presentation is provided by Laffont and Tirole (1993), while more recent work is surveyed by Armstrong and Sappington (2003).”
- Price Discrimination and Competition (2007, background): “For a discussion of the same effect in the context of regulation, see Section 4.5 of Armstrong and Sappington (2007) in this volume. of the individual prices.77 Moreover, if consumer reservation values are independently distributed across goods, as the number of goods increases, the law of large…”
- Incentive Regulation and Its Application to Electricity Networks (2008, background): “The recent theoretical literature on incentive regulation focuses on devising regulatory mechanisms to respond to these moral hazard and adverse selection problems (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Armstrong and Sappington, 2007).”
- Productive efficiency and regulatory reform: The case of vehicle inspection services (2006, methodology): “Some authors have suggested, however, that these regulatory systems may be the result of a political equilibrium and may provide a credible commitment to yield adequate levels of investment (see for instance Armstrong and Sappington, 2005). uncertainty appears to be detrimental for technical change.”
- Incentive regulation and investment: evidence from European energy utilities (2010, background): “2 Incentive regulation is usually implemented as price- or revenue-cap mechanisms (Littlechild, 1983), through the application of fixed-price contracts (Armstrong and Sappington, 2007).”
- Privatization and Efficiency: From Principals and Agents to Political Economy (2008, unknown): “5. For a recent and unified analysis of economic models dealing with regulation in the framework of imperfect information, the interested reader can refer to Armstrong and Sappington (2007) .”