Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective

By D. Zahavi. 2005

769 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2472e9f3fd983801ca850c7c7cb9463256a03cd4

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In Philosophy

Citations in the corpus

The phenomenology and development of social perspectives (2013, positive): “Therefore, it has recently been proposed to introduce the notion of the second person or intersubjective perspective (2PP) in order to overcome the antagonism of first and third person or subjective and objective perspective (Gallagher 2001, 2008; Zahavi 2001, 2005, p. 206–214; Reddy 2003).”
Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis (2009, positive): “Moreover, both traditions are joined in their focus on the primacy of embodied (rather than linguistic) interactions (cf. Zahavi 2005, p. 176).”
Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz (2010, neutral): “In previous writings, I have offered various criticisms of the theory-theory and simulation theory of mind, and I will not rehearse that criticism here (Zahavi 2005, 2007, 2008).”
Phenomenological Psychopathology and Schizophrenia: Contemporary Approaches and Misunderstandings (2011, positive): “It was broached by Husserl himself (see, e.g., his discussion with H.J. Watt in §79 of Ideas I [Husserl 1982]) and was later discussed by numerous authors within the phenomenological tradition (cf. Chapter 4 in Zahavi 2005).”
Merging second-person and first-person neuroscience (2013, neutral): “, Goldman 2006; see Newen & Schlicht 2009 for a critical discussion), recent debates have, therefore, led to alternatives which emphasize various aspects of embeddedness and embodiedness in social cognition (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; Fuchs 2009; Gallagher 2005; 2008; Hutto 2008; Noë 2009; Reddy 20”
Understanding the neural bases of bodily self-consciousness: recent achievements and main challenges (2023, unknown): “Whereas the bodily self and cognitive self are conceptually different, there are theoretical and experimental arguments to suggest that they cannot be separated (e.g., Zahavi, 2005), overlap partially, and that self-consciousness emerges from interactions between both levels (Gallagher, 2013).”