Omission bias, individual differences, and normality

By J. Baron, Ilana Ritov. 2004

327 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Applied Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/237c73bc07c5de7ee2f119e7ee2e89a22ea9bb8f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Applied Psychology

1. Celia Moore
2. Francesca Gino
3. Fiery Cushman
4. Eric Schwitzgebel
5. J. Logg

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Fiery Cushman
2. Liane L. Young
3. Celia Moore
4. Eric Schwitzgebel
5. Francesca Gino
6. Marc D. Hauser
7. Rebecca Saxe
8. Joshua D. Greene

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Fiery Cushman
2. Celia Moore
3. Francesca Gino
4. Marc D. Hauser
5. Liane L. Young
6. Eric Schwitzgebel
7. J. Logg

Citations in the corpus

• Susceptibility to anchoring effects: How openness-to-experience influences responses to anchoring cues (2007, unknown): “…in numerical reliance (Bartels, 2006; McElroy & Seta, 2003; Peters, Vastfall, & Slovic, 2006; Simon, Fagley, & Halleran, 2004), ambiguity (Lauriola & Levin, 2001; Nowlis, Kahn, & Dhar, 2002), preference for actions or inactions (Baron & Ritov, 2004) and the optimistic bias (Buehler & Griffin, 2003).”
• The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment (2006, background): “The action principle has been well researched in psychology, where it is often called omission bias (Baron & Ritov, 2004; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991).”
• Ethically adrift: How others pull our moral compass from true North, and how we can fix it (2013, background): “The bystander effect is robust in part because it allows people to take advantage of a bias that causes us to evaluate acts more harshly than omissions and direct causation as worse than indirect causation (Baron & Ritov, 2004; Greene & Darley, 1998).”
• Biases in casino betting: The hot hand and the gambler’s fallacy (2006, unknown): “12This behavior is consistent with the status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) or the omission/commission bias (Ritov and Baron 1992, Baron and Ritov 2004), as this chip represents a bet that has been placed by default. Thus one can interpret a positive significant coefficient on this variab”
• Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. (2008, background): “…cognitive development tradition of moral psychology pioneered by Piaget have emphasized the dominance of intentional factors over causal factors in adult moral judgment (e.g. Hebble, 1971; Baron & Ritov, 2004; Shultz, Wright, & Schleifer, 1986; Yuill & Perner, 1988; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996).”
• Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers (2012, background): “Such cases have been invoked to support a moral principle distinguishing between action and omission or doing and allowing (Bennett, 1998; Howard-Snyder, 2002/2007; Quinn, 1989), again reflected in ordinary people’s judgments (Baron and Ritov, 2004; Cushman et al., 2006; Spranca et al., 1991).”