Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard

By Antonio E. Bernardo, Hongbin Cai, Jiang Luo. 2001

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Real Options Signaling Games with Applications to Corporate Finance (2011, unknown): “…setting in which a manager can divert a portion of the project's cash flows for private consumption, which makes the problem a timing analogue of the literature on agency, asymmetric information, and capital budgeting (e.g., Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv 1982; Stulz 1990; Bernardo, Cai, and Luo 2001).”
Proactive R&D management and firm growth: A punctuated equilibrium model (2011, background): “Modifying the firm’s R&D activities to move between exploration and exploitation is particularly challenging because of the high level of information asymmetry that exists between executive managers and R&D project mangers within the firm (Bernardo et al., 2001; Stein, 2003).”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “For example, Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) developed an economic model to disentangle whether the executive behaviors required by specific jobs determined pay structure or whether pay structure determined executive behaviors.”
Evidence on the Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets (2010, background): “For models that analyze a single manager in isolation, see Harris and Raviv (1996), Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2001) and Marino and Matsusaka (2005).”