Corruption and Decentralization of Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries

By P. Bardhan, Dilip Mookherjee. 2000

149 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1cffc7925e29e16daddb99c195404c2799d7b57b

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Citations in the corpus

Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Programs (2002, result): “In fact, in some cases, expenditure decentralization unaccompanied by revenue decentralization is even predicted to increase corruption, relative to the 'centralized' benchmark (see Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000a).”
Decentralisation and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries (2006, unknown): “We examine the trade-off under three different financing arrangements: 6 The case of welfare services is somewhat different and is addressed in a separate paper (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000b).”
Democratization, Decentralization and the Distribution of Local Public Goods in a Poor Rural Economy (2001, unknown): “enhancing (e.g., Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Besley and Coate 2001).”
Traditional Governance, Citizen Engagement, and Local Public Goods: Evidence from Mexico (2014, background): “(2)Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) have shown, in a formal model, that centralized systems of public service delivery are more subject to corruption. However, they also note that local elites might capture governments making them less efficient than a centralized arrangement. Besley and Coate (2003) h”
Participatory Development in the Presence of Endogenous Community Imperfections (2002, background): “The poor are then better targeted through a state distribution system than through a decentralised mechanism [Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999, 2000a, 2000b].”
The disadvantaged incumbents: estimating incumbency effects in Indian state legislatures (2005, background): “Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 2005, 2006) further argue that the poorer sections of the society get captured by the local elites who want the policies disproportionately biased towards their preferences.”
Localization and Corruption: Panacea or Pandora's Box? (2005, unknown): “Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) also argue that decentralization of the delivery of antipoverty programs in developing countries promotes cost-effectiveness and reduces corruption, owing to the superior access of local governments to information on local costs and needs.”
The Risk of Resource Misappropriation in Community-Driven Development (2003, background): “…dominant economic, social, and political position to appropriate for themselves whatever portion of the resources that they need and to let the poor have the leftovers only (Conning and Kevane, 2002; Galasso and Ravallion, forthcoming; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Bardhan, 2002).”