Democratization, Decentralization and the Distribution of Local Public Goods in a Poor Rural Economy

By Andrew D. Foster, Mark R. Rosenzweig. 2001

191 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Local Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from Ecuador (2006, background): “Examining India, Rosenzweig and Foster (2003) show that increases in the population weight of the poor result in increases in the likelihood of receiving pro-poor projects (such as roads) in villages with elected panchayats, but not in villages with more traditional leadership structures,…”
The Transforming Power of Democracy: Regime Type and the Distribution of Electricity (2009, background): “health and education (Betancourt and Gleason 2000; Foster and Ronsenzweig 2001 ).”
The Effects of Participatory Budgeting on Municipal Expenditures and Infant Mortality in Brazil (2014, background): “…and thus provides an additional test of the (argued) advantage of decentralized and participatory regimes for tailoring policies to the demands and needs of the local population (see Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani, & Shah, 2005; Faguet, 2012; Faguet & Sánchez, 2008; Foster & Rosenzweig, 2001).”
Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India (2012, unknown): “…village is favored, are more consistent with the latter view.3 Whether the policy choices of elected legislators will reflect the interests of the 2In line with this view, Faguet (2004) and Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) both argue that decentralization affects whose policy preferences are decisive.”
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services (2005, background): “Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) and Pande (2003) show that when disadvantaged groups in India—the landless poor and scheduled castes—were newly able to elect their own representatives, more government resources flowed toward these disadvantaged groups.”
The Role of the State in Economic Development (2005, unknown): “For instance, Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) and Pande (2003) have shown that enhanced political rights of disadvantaged groups in India did not give rise to improvements in broad welfare services or education helping the poor, but rather to selective targeting towards these groups through access to…”
Democracy, visibility and public good provision (2007, background): “5 This primarily empirical literature includes Betancourt and Gleason (2000), Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) among others.”
Elections, fiscal reform and public goods provision in rural China (2007, background): “Rosenzweig and Foster (2003) demonstrate that local democratization is positively correlated with the provision of local public goods in general.”
Grassroots Democracy and Local Governance: Evidence from Rural China (2007, background): “Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) found that village elections in India had led to more investment in road building instead of irrigation facilities.”
Decentralization, Corruption And Government Accountability: An Overview (2005, background): “Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) provide evidence from an all-India panel dataset of 250 villages that increased local democracy between the early 1980s and late 1990s (measured by whether local governments were selected via local elections) increased responsiveness of local government spending to the…”
Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor : Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services (2003, unknown): “Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) and Pande (2003) have shown that when disadvantaged groups in India the landless poor and scheduled castes (respectively) were newly able to elect their own representatives, more government resources flowed towards these disadvantaged groups.”
Pro-poor targeting and accountability of local governments in West Bengal (2006, background): “As Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) argue, road projects are more employment-intensive than irrigation projects, so the poor and non-poor may have conflicting preferences between road and irrigation projects if irrigation projects raise the profitability of medium or large farms more than do road…”