Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Programs

By Raymond J. Fisman, Robert Gatti. 2002

281 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fde56c0661e4bb0d64274c30de402bacb65f70ea

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Citations in the corpus

Decentralization, Corruption And Government Accountability: An Overview (2005, background): “In another paper Fisman and Gatti (2002b) argue -- analogous to the finding of Estache and Sinha -- that the effects of expenditure decentralization may depend on accompanying revenue decentralization.”
On the link between fiscal decentralization and public debt in OECD countries (2010, background): “For example, Fisman and Gatti (2002) show for US states that vertical federal transfers are associated with higher rates of conviction for abuse of public office.”
One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats (2010, unknown): “As the level of corruption in a country is not solely determined by decentralization, our estimations include several control variables following previous cross-country studies, e.g., the study of Fisman and Gatti (2002a) and Arikan (2004).”
Corruption, Political Connections, and Municipal Finance (2009, methodology): “These data are available from the U.S. Department of Justice Public Integrity Section, and similar ex post measures of corruption have been widely used by Glaeser and Saks (2006), Fredricksson, List, and Millimet (2003), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and others.”
Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: evidence from OECD countries (2013, methodology): “2 Fisman and Gatti (2002a) and Mello and Barenstein (2001) find that increased decentralization (measured as the budgetary share of subnational governments) is associated with lower levels of corruption.”
Measures of corruption and determinants of US corruption (2011, background): “The extant literature focusing on the US has almost exclusively used federal corruption convictions to denote corruption (see for examples, Fisman and Gatti 2002b; Glaeser and Saks 2006; Goel and Nelson 2007, 1998; Goel and Rich 1989).”
Tax me, but spend wisely? Sources of public finance and government accountability (2015, background): “Fisman and Gatti (2002) establish a positive relationship between the proportion of US states’ revenues derived from federal transfers and the number of convictions of public employees for abuse of public office.”
Does Greater Accountability Improve the Quality of Public Service Delivery? Evidence from Uganda (2005, background): “Although more limited, evidence from within country studies supports these results (Fisman & Gatti, 2002b; Gomez & Gallon, 2002).”
US political corruption and firm financial policies (2016, methodology): “Fisman and Gatti (2002), Glaeser and Saks (2006), and Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009) use these data to study corruption in the US.”
Corruption in America (2006, background): “Fisman and Gatti (2002) also find no meaningful relationship between government size and corruption.”
Corruption and Corporate Innovation (2019, unknown): “3Many other studies use these data as a proxy for local political corruption (e.g., Fisman and Gatti (2002), Fredricksson, List, and Millimet (2003), Depken and LaFountain (2006), Glaeser and Saks (2006), Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009), and Smith (2016)). significant: An interquartile increase…”