Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device

By Juan D. Carrillo, Thomas Mariotti. 2000

419 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1b0f725c0b304659ce18305356f999de917c1119

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Citations in the corpus

Time-Inconsistency and Welfare Program Participation: Evidence from the Nlsy (2009, neutral): “…and Rabin (1999a,b) to consumption and savings; by Barro (1999) to growth; by Gruber and Koszegi (2001) to smoking decisions; by Krusell, Kuruşçu, and Smith (2002) to optimal tax policy; by Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) to belief formation; and by Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) to job search.”
Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation (2002, background): “In an important paper Carrillo and Mariotti [2000] showed that, in the presence of time inconsistency (TI), Blackwell garblings of information may increase the current self’s payoff.”
Rational irrationality: Some economics of self-management (2002, background): “The economic approach to self-regulation – common to our work and that of Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and Brocas and Carrillo (1999) – thus suggests a link between two hitherto disjoint areas of experimental psychology, namely those on intertemporal preferences and self-esteem maintenance.”
The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization (2008, neutral): “At each period, the individual decides his level of consumption ct (> 0) and labor nt (∈ [0, n̄]) or, equivalently, the amount of leisure lt = n̄ − nt.”
Self-Regulation Through Goal Setting (2011, neutral): “Goals have mainly been studied by psychologists (see references above), and we are aware of only one paper in the economics literature: Falk and Knell (2004) investigate in a social comparison model how the motives of self-enhancement (people use comparisons with others to make themselves feel bette”
Exploiting moral wiggle room: Illusory preference for fairness? A comment (2009, neutral): “Keywords: dictator games, experiments, fairness, strategic ignorance.”
Self-signaling and self-control. (2003, background): “Hence, individuals with face-value interpretations will leave the choice situation with an excessively positive self-image, on average.7 7 Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), Brocas and Carillo (1999, 2000), Benabou and Tirole (1999), and Koszegi (1999) present other models that give rise to an…”
Modes of Communication (2005, background): “Another possible reason why people may pay little attention to counterattitudinal messages is that such messages may threaten the ego, and so “rational ignorance” (e.g., Carrillo and Mariotti 2000; Bénabou and Tirole 2002) may prevail.”
Optimal Sin Taxes (2006, methodology): “It has been used in recent years by numerous authors, including Laibson (1997,1998), Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998), Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman and Weinberg (2001), O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) (2001), Fischer (1999), Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), and Benabou and Tirole (2002).”
Decreasing Impatience: A Criterion for Non-Stationary Time Preference and 'Hyperbolic' Discounting (2004, background): “From the theorist’s standpoint, the beauty of the hyperbolic assumption is that it appears to explain flagrant violations of normative principles, such as selection of dominated outcomes or rejection of information by appealing to an aspect of preference, while leaving the agent’s underlying rationa”
Identity, Dignity and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets (2007, neutral): “…(2001), Landier (2000), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005)), a concern for self-image (Köszegi (2004)), or nonlinear moral payoffs (Rabin (1995)), and those that reflect more functional motives (Carrillo and Mariotti (2000), Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2006a), Battaglini et al. (2005), Dessi (2005)).”