Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions

By Richard Jensen, Marie C. Thursby. 2001

128 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1ab762e8fcd756a54915425d1ac5b5fad09e7753

Citations in the corpus

• From separate systems to a hybrid order: accumulative advantage across public and private science at Research One universities (2003, unknown): “In addition, university innovations tend to be early stage 'proofs of concept', which carry less immediate commercial value (Jensen and Thursby, 2001).”
• Universities and Fundamental Research: Reflections on the Growth of University–Industry Partnerships (2002, unknown): “14 See Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, and Link (2002).”
• The Disclosure and Licensing of University Inventions (2003, unknown): “See Jensen and Thursby (2001) and Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby (2000) for the prevalence of royalty contracts. (6)See Jensen and Thursby (2001) for an analysis of the inefficiency of royalty as compared to equity contracts.”
• University spillovers and new firm location (2005, unknown): “For university patenting see Jensen and Thursby (2001) and Jensen et al (2003).”
• Crossing the Rubicon: exploring the factors that shape academics' perceptions of the barriers to working with industry (2012, unknown): “Interactions between university scientists and industry partners often involve turning embryonic research into marketable technologies, where the commitment of both sides is instrumental for the success of the endeavour (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Dechenaux et al., 2009).”
• The expanding role of university patenting in the life sciences: assessing the importance of experience and connectivity (2003, unknown): “Jensen and Thursby (2001) find that that such 'proof' patents are much more difficult to license lucratively than are technologies which have reached the prototype stage.”
• Are Faculty Critical? Their Role in University-Industry Licensing (2003, unknown): “Such monitoring is more important with sponsored research agreements than with licenses since license agreements can and do include payment types that are linked to faculty effort (see Jensen and Thursby, 2001).”
• Models and Methods of University Technology Transfer (2013, unknown): “Because lump sum payments provide no incentive for the scientist to engage in continued development, output-based payments, like royalties and equity, solve this moral hazard problem by linking the scientist’s license income to additional effort (Jensen and Thursby, 2001).”