Going Public: The Theory and Evidence on How Companies Raise Equity Finance

By T. Jenkinson, Alexander P. Ljungqvist. 2001

415 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/180a2b35f4726f4bb75b646c4ed280e2cb0e2376

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Citations in the corpus

Why Don't Issuers Get Upset About Leaving Money on the Table in Ipos? (2002, unknown): “Many reasons have been given for why underwriters underprice IPOs, on average [see Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994) and Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) for surveys].”
Disclosure of information on intellectual capital in Danish IPO prospectuses (2005, background): “Most under-pricing models (see Jenkinson and Ljungquist, 2001 ) predict that reducing ex ante uncertainty, for example by improved disclosure, and reduces under-pricing.”
Does Prospect Theory Explain IPO Market Behavior (2005, background): “These findings provide the foundation for Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) formulation of prospect theory.(3) Prospect theory asserts that individuals make choices under uncertainty by maximizing a value function that evaluates wealth changes, rather than an expected utility function that ranks choices”
Cycles in the IPO market (2008, background): “The connections between demand for capital and IPO volume, and between underpricing and IPO volume, are of course already widely documented; see for example Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Lowry and Schwert (2002), Lowry (2003), and Pastor and Veronesi (2005).”
An Integrated Agency-Resource Dependence View of the Influence of Directors' Human and Relational Capital on Firms' R&D Spending (2011, background): “In select cases, they may even discourage ambitious long-term investments by the firm ( Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2002), including those in R&D.”
Hot Markets, Investor Sentiment, and IPO Pricing (2003, unknown): “Salient among these are allocation practices that discriminate against retail investors, underwriters’ price support activities, penalty bids on syndicate members whose clients ‘flip’ the stock in the early after-market, and lock-up provisions barring insiders from selling shares in the first 180 da”
Strategic IPO Underpricing, Information Momentum, and Lockup Expiration Selling (2002, unknown): “There are many reasonable explanations for moderate amounts of underpricing in the literature (see Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001).”
IPO Underpricing Over the Very Long Run (2009, unknown): “since the pricing of rights issues is wealth-neutral ( Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, pp. 79 ).”
Managerial Agents Watching other Agents: Multiple Agency Conflicts Regarding Underpricing in IPO Firms (2008, background): “Firm commitment deals are much more common particularly by prestigious underwriters (see Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2002 for additional insight).”