Why Don't Issuers Get Upset About Leaving Money on the Table in Ipos?

By Tim Loughran, Jay R. Ritter. 2002

1,385 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1076b605d2b5ecd3f1de7bc6412069b02565bc3b

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Citations in the corpus

Governance, ownership structure, and performance of IPO firms: The impact of different types of private equity investors and institutional environments (2009, background): “…reputation (Chahine et al., 2007), we verify whether more prestigious underwriters have a third-party certifying role (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) or are more likely to seek their own advantage by charging lower fees and leaving more money on the table (Cooney et al., 2001; Loughran and Ritter, 2002).”
Discounts On Illiquid Stocks: Evidence From China (2001, background): “See Bailey (1994) and others for the relative price behavior between A- and B-shares in China.”
Board Independence, Ownership Structure and the Valuation of IPOs in Continental Europe (2014, neutral): “However, the existing literature indicates that underwriters systematically discount their value estimates, in order to augment investor participation and compensate for information disclosure by informed investors (Loughran & Ritter, 2002).”
The Value Relevance of Financial Statements in the Venture Capital Market (2005, background): “…excluded the IPO itself as a valuation point because a substantial body of literature has concluded that equity values set at and close to IPOs are associated with notable anomalies (e.g., Shiller 1990; Ritter 1991; Ritter and Loughran 1995, 2002; Ritter 2000; Purnanandam and Swaminathan 2004).”
Why Has IPO Underpricing Increased Over Time (2002, background): “Loughran and Ritter (2002) instead emphasize the quid pro quos that underwriters receive from buy-side clients in return for allocating underpriced IPOs to them.”
Investment Banking and Securities Issuance (2003, background): “Loughran and Ritter (2002) provide an explanation for this issuer complacency about severe underpricing using prospect theory.”
Strategic IPO Underpricing, Information Momentum, and Lockup Expiration Selling (2002, neutral): “Finally, Loughran and Ritter (2002) argue, based on prospect theory, that due to the positive covariance between managerial wealth changes and underpricing, managers are not unhappy with highly underpriced deals.”
Underwriter Networks, Investor Attention, and Initial Public Offerings (2016, neutral): “See, e.g., Hanley (1993), Loughran and Ritter (2002) , and Bradley and Jordan (2002) .”
Innovation, Appropriability, And The Underpricing Of Initial Public Offerings (2007, neutral): “More recent work (e.g., Beard, Neuhauser, Mantecon, & Ryan, 2002; Loughran & Ritter, 2002 ) has yielded similar results.”
The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial Institutions (2006, neutral): “New explanations have emerged in response to these extremely large first-day returns, including behavioral explanations (Loughran and Ritter, 2002) and agency explanations (e.g., Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003).”
Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2015, neutral): “…outlying deals by ensuring that the results (unreported) hold in quantile regressions (i.e., 20Specifically, we define high-tech firms, following Loughran and Ritter (2002), as those whose industries are in computer hardware (SIC: 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578), communication equipment (SIC:…”
Do Today's Trades Affect Tomorrow's IPO Allocations? (2007, background): “The profit-sharing view, exposited by Loughran and Ritter (2002, 2004) and Reuter (2006), argues that hot IPOs are allocated to investors who direct commission business to the investment banking firm in return.”