Earnings Management Following Duality-Creating Successions: Ethnostatistics, Impression Management and Agency Theory

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Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management (2011, methodology): “This model has been found to be the most powerful in detecting earnings management among competing models (Dechow et al., 1995), as well as effective (Davidson et al., 2004), and reliable (Guay et al., 1996).”
CEO Duality, Agency Costs, and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency (2019, unknown): “These findings also complement prior literature (see, for example, Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Davidson et al. , 2004; Aguilera et al. , 2008; Duru et al. , 2016), as they offer additional evidence in support of the substitution hypothesis of internal corporate governance…”
CEOS ON THE EDGE: EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND STOCK-BASED INCENTIVE MISALIGNMENT (2008, background): “Earnings manipulation is intentional misapplication of accounting rules and misreporting of financial results that causes reported income to be larger or smaller than it would otherwise be (Davidson et al., 2004; Elitzur & Yaari, 1995; General Accounting Office [GAO], 2003).”
CEO age and stock price crash risk (2017, methodology): “2 In addition, we measure CEO duality (DUALITYt-1) using a binary variable which equals 1 when the positions of CEO and Chairman are held by the same person, and zero otherwise (Davidson et al., 2004).”