Corporate Governance in China: An Overview

By D. Clarke. 2003

300 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Law

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/14be3d7cffd8eac67ddc83288ba5316b8b72ddc8

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Marc van Essen
2. Dean Xu
3. P. Duran
4. Mike W. Peng
5. Sabrina F. Saleh
6. Canan C. Mutlu
7. Yi Tang
8. Jiatao Li

In Law

1. P. Duran
2. Sabrina F. Saleh
3. Xiaofei Pan
4. Mike W. Peng
5. Chunyan Liu
6. Zhou Lu
7. Jiatao Li
8. Wenxuan Hou

Citations in the corpus

• Disproportional Ownership Structure and Pay-Performance Relationship: Evidence from China's Listed Firms (2011, background): “We also find no relationship between duality and CEO pay, which is similar to Conyon’s (1997) analysis of British firms, but contrary Core et al.’s (1999) findings that duality in U.”
• Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective ☆ (2007, background): “Even worse, the state is playing two roles at the same time — the controlling shareholder and the regulator (see Clarke, 2003; Firth et al., 2006 for a discussion of the state agency being the majority shareholder in China).”
• Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud (2010, background): “This is in line with the literature (see Cheung et al., 2010; Clarke, 2003; Gul et al., 2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) that state ownership aggravates agency problems.”
• Corporate Governance in China: A Meta‐Analysis (2018, methodology): “The literature on corporate governance in China has featured a few narrative reviews (Clarke, 2003; Guo et al., 2013; Jiang and Kim, 2015; Yang et al., 2011).”
• Ownership structure, corporate governance, and fraud: Evidence from China (2006, unknown): “China has unique ownership characteristics and governance structures (Clarke, 2003) and so our hypotheses are somewhat different from those in the U.S. General hypotheses are developed in the next section.”
• Principal—Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation (2008, background): “Influenced by a long ideological tradition favouring state ownership and centralized control, some of these people may even believe that their primary duty is to safeguard the interests of the controlling shareholder, namely the State (Clarke, 2003).”
• Determinants and features of voluntary disclosure in the Chinese stock market (2013, background): “Consequently, they have different corporate governance mechanisms compared to firms listed in the United States, most of which are privately controlled (Xu and Wang, 1999; Qiang, 2003; Clarke, 2003; Wang et al., 2004).”
• Corporate Board and Corporate Social Responsibility Assurance: Evidence from China (2016, unknown): “However, in the past China has been criticized by the western media for the lack of effective corporate board governance (e.g., Clarke 2003; Dahya et al. 2003).”
• CEO Hubris and Firm Risk Taking in China: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion (2010, background): “vated appointment of key managers (Clarke, 2003).”
• Corporate governance and firm value during the global financial crisis: Evidence from China (2012, background): “Bai et al. (2000) and Clarke (2003) argue that SOEs principally aim to maintain employment and social stability rather than profit maximization, which engenders agency conflicts between the state and minority 11 shareholders.”
• Corporate Governance in China - is Economic Growth Potential Hindered by Guanxi? (2005, unknown): “But the state may as well follow less social aims and abuse its authority for purposes such as politically motivated job placement (Clarke, 2003; Xu and Wang, 1999) or simple power maximization of bureaucrats (Mueller, 2003).”