Corporate Earnings: Facts and Fiction
By Baruch Lev. 2003
140 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/13bd9d24cda9218e4a779f3c7d3fbf56c50221a3
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In Accounting
- S. Cahan
- Dechun Wang
- C. V. Van Staden
- Qiang Cheng
- Jere R. Francis
- Annalisa Prencipe
- Phillip T. Lamoreaux
- Daniel Aobdia
Citations in the corpus
- The Relation Between Earnings Management Using Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence from Meeting Earnings Benchmarks*: Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance (2009, unknown): “…by engaging in RM and future performance is also consistent with signaling managerial competence or future firm performance (Bartov et al. 2002; Lev 2003).7 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) suggest that meeting earnings benchmarks may enhance firms’ credibility and reputation with stakeholders…”
- Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality (2006, methodology): “9 Basu’s [1997, table 1] reverse regression model is more widely used in accounting literature to examine earnings conservatism or timely loss recognition. However, I do not find a significant relation between family ownership and timely loss recognition using Basu’s [1997] reverse regression approa”
- Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting and Earnings Management: The Role of Political Costs (2011, background): “As earnings management leads to lower earnings quality, it reduces the predictive ability of future earnings and cash flows (Lev 2003).”
- The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting (2005, unknown): “Agency costs Agency issues may represent an important tension that explains lack of full disclosure, as suggested by Nanda et al. (2003) and Berger and Hann (2003).”