Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality
By Dechun Wang. 2006
1,069 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/af1ebfebe393fdd7d21cb4ee9572cbd32688e5a3
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In Accounting
- Terry Shevlin
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Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Survey of Literature (2013, result): “Wang (2006) also provides evidence consistent with prior studies.”
- Family Firm Research – A Review (2014, positive): “Consistent with this notion, they find that family firms report higher earnings quality, including lower discretionary accruals, higher predictability of cash flows, and higher earnings response coefficients, thus corroborating the results reported by Wang (2006).”
- Family SMEs' Internationalization: Disentangling the Influence of Familiness on Spanish Firms' Export Activity** (2015, background): “This may be due to their concern of preserving the family control in order to pass the business to future generations (Wang 2006) and therefore, their tendency to avoid the risks associated with their foreign expansion (McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko 2001).”
- Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone (2011, positive): “Third, the long-term presence of this type of shareholder in the company and its concern for the family name’s reputation has been shown to lead to higher earnings quality (Wang, 2006), which may be related to lower information asymmetries between current and prospective investors.”
- The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms (2011, neutral): “Wang (2006) however, finds that founding family ownership is associated with higher earnings quality for a sample of S&P 500 firms.”
- Accounting Research in Family Firms: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges (2014, background): “…vs. nonfamily Family members on the board Family firms are more inclined to disclose all required items for the primary basis of segment reporting Wang (2006) JAR FA Earnings quality Agency Family vs. nonfamily % ownership or family member on the board/top management Family firms have higher…”
- Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets? (2014, methodology): “In the same line, Wang (2006) and”
- Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure (2008, positive): “, Anderson and Reeb 2003) and higher earnings quality (Wang 2006; Ali et al. 2007) .”
- Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Jordan (2016, methodology): “We use the absolute value because either positive or negative discretionary accruals are considered as earnings management behavior (Wartfield et al., 1995; Gabrielsen et al., 2002; Wang, 2006; Chen et al., 2007; Barth et al. 2008).”
- Financial Reporting and the Protection of Socioemotional Wealth in Family-Controlled Firms (2014, background): “, 2007) and a long-term investment horizon (Wang, 2006) will reduce agency conflicts between shareholders and managers and lessen the hazard of information asymmetries (Chen et al., 2008; Wang, 2006) leading to lower incentives to manage earnings or withhold information.”
- Does Family Involvement Explain Why Corporate Social Responsibility Affects Earnings Management (2017, positive): “Wang (2006) shows that family ownership reduces earnings management.”
- Real Earnings Management and Accrual-based Earnings Management in Family Firms (2014, methodology): “We choose this variable because it has been used extensively in the literature on family firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Wang, 2006).”
- The Role of International Financial Reporting Standards in Accounting Quality: Evidence from the European Union (2010, methodology): “There is no significant difference in financial leverage (LEV), Big 4/5 auditors (AUD), number of exchanges listing the firm (NUMEX), and cross-listing in the United States (XLIST) between the pre-adoption period and the adoption period.”