A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities

By Edi Karni. 2009

244 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1396d4df3d5607b492d19690f50e4288a8378768

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Citations in the corpus

A penny for your thoughts: a survey of methods for eliciting beliefs (2014, unknown): “Krawczyk (2011) shows that using incentives for interval elicitation improves the level of calibration of subjects.”
The Binarized Scoring Rule (2013, methodology): “…who compare two variations of the mechanism by Karni (2009), Hollard, Massoni, and Vergnaud (2010) who found methods similar to the one proposed by Karni (2009) and simply asking subjects about beliefs outperform the QSR, and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2011) who run a horse race of different…”
Good news and bad news are still news: experimental evidence on belief updating (2019, unknown): “7 See Karni (2009) for a more detailed description of the lottery method, though the method has been described in a number of earlier papers, see Schlag et al.”
Eliciting beliefs: Proper scoring rules, incentives, stakes and hedging (2010, background): “This is the case, for instance, for the standard lottery mechanism (Kadane and Winkler 1988) and for the direct revelation mechanism recently proposed by Karni (2009).”
The Control Premium: A Preference for Payoff Autonomy † (2014, methodology): “First, we use a crossover or lottery mechanism (Allen 1987, Grether 1992, Karni 2009) to elicit probabilities, which avoids bias due to risk-attitudes, but introduces a possible bias that would lower the measured value of the control premium.”
Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis (2018, background): “Karni (2009) proves this same result for the probability-elicitation version of the BDM mechanism. The second-price auction of Vickrey (1961) can also be thought of as an RPS mechanism using exactly the same framework, except that the random choice of the decision problem is determined by the second”
Evidence on Self-Stereotyping and the Contribution of Ideas (2014, methodology): “Economists and psychologists have documented that individuals have diffi culty calibrating beliefs about ability, both relative to actual ability and relative to others (see Moore and Healy (2007)).”
Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race Among Truth Serums (2015, unknown): “Hoa and Houser (2010) compare two implementations of probability matching proposed by Karni (2009).”