Advertising, Learning, and Consumer Choice in Experience Good Markets: A Structural Empirical Examination

By Daniel A. Ackerberg. 1999

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Panel Data Discrete Choice Models of Consumer Demand (2013, background): “Examples of structural learning models are Ecsktein, Horsky and Raban (1988), Roberts and Urban (1988), Erdem and Keane (1996), Ackerberg (2003), Crawford and Shum (2005) and Ching (2010).”
An Empirical Model of Optimal Dynamic Product Launch and Exit Under Demand Uncertainty (2006, background): “11 See also Ackerberg (2003) for a related approach.”
Advertising in a Competitive Market: The Role of Product Standards, Customer Learning, and Switching Costs (2013, background): “Learning costs describe the time and effort customers incur when learning how to use a new product (Ackerberg 2003; Crawford and Shum 2005; Erdem and Keane 1996).”
Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods (2006, background): “The model has a number of features which will (2)A partial list of recent papers includes Erdem & Keane (1996), Erdem, Imai & Keane (2003), Ackerberg (2003), Israel (2005), Osborne (2005) and Goettler & Clay (2006).”
Invited Paper - Learning Models: An Assessment of Progress, Challenges, and New Developments (2011, unknown): “We discuss these in turn: Ackerberg (2003) deviates from Erdem-Keane in several dimensions.”
Econometric Tools for Analyzing Market Outcomes (2007, unknown): “Studies of demand for advertised experience goods include Erdem and Keane (1996), Ackerberg (2003), and Crawford and Shum (2005).”
Expert Opinion and the Demand for Experience Goods: An Experimental Approach in the Retail Wine Market (2011, background): “(2) Qist = β0 +β1Tis +β2tit +β3Tis ∗ tit + δXist +γ(Xist ∗Tis)+λ(Xist ∗ tit) +θ(Xist ∗ Tis ∗ tit) + π(priceist ∗ scoreist ∗ Tis ∗ tit) + ist where Xist is a matrix that contains the variables price, discount, red, and score.”
Discrete Choice Models with Multiple Unobserved Choice Characteristics (2007, unknown): “By providing formal support for the ability of characteristic-based models to rationalize choice data, this discussion complements the substantive discussion in, among others, Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes (2006) who argue in favor of characteristics-based approaches, and and the contrasting a”
Dynamics of Consumer Demand for New Durable Goods (2012, unknown): “Ackerberg & Rysman (2005) argue that this feature implies that logit-based models will perform poorly in contexts where consumers face different numbers of products over time.”
A Dynamic Model of Brand Choice When Price and Advertising Signal Product Quality (2008, background): “…that dynamics in consumer demand have important implications for market equilibrium has recently led to a burst of interest by industrial organization economists in estimation of dynamic demand models (see, e.g., Ching (2002), Crawford and Shum (2003), Ackerberg (2003), Hendel and Nevo (2002)).”
Uncertainty and Learning in Pharmaceutical Demand (2005, background): “Page 4 The closest empirical antecedents to our work in the analysis of product markets are the Bayesian learning models of Ackerberg (1996) and Erdem and Keane (1996) for consumer nondurables markets.3 This paper extends these models, however, by directly incorporating \outcome measures" | here a p”
Just Starting Out: Learning and Equilibrium in a New Market (2018, unknown): “In the IO and marketing literature, a number of papers have examined how agents may learn their demand for experience goods from their own experimentation (Erdem and Keane 1996, Ackerberg 2003, Dickstein 2013). There is also a small empirical literature on observational learning, where agents see th”
Structural Modeling in Marketing: Review and Assessment (2006, background): “11 Keane (1996) model the direct informative role of advertising on quality expectations (advertising content provides direct quality information); Ackerberg (2003) models the indirect informative role (signaling) of advertising on consumer quality expectations (advertising frequency signals quality”