Winners don’t punish

By Anna Dreber, David G. Rand, Drew Fudenberg, Martin A. Nowak. Nature, 2008

711 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/10e67c3b69482974415539930be7031c9be93760

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Citations in the corpus

Spontaneous giving and calculated greed (2012, methodology): “Cooperation in stochastically repeated PD with/without costly punishment (data from Dreber et al 2008 Nature).”
Coevolutionary games - A mini review (2009, neutral): “Notably, other strategies, such as loners [see.g. Hauert and Szabó (2005)] or punishers [see.g. Dreber et al. (2008)] are also possible, but their inclusion to evolutionary games with coevolutionary rules has not yet been considered.”
Statistical physics of human cooperation (2017, background): “Given the relative abundance of such antisocial behavior in human societies [87], one rightfully questions the whole concept of punishment, and whether positive interactions might be the better way forward [56,57].”
Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans (2011, methodology): “8, and used the same set of 10 game lengths for the 10 games in each condition (as in (6, 7)).”
Evolutionary accounts of belief in supernatural punishment: a critical review (2011, background): “Leaving aside general debates over group selection, recent theoretical and empirical analyses suggest that punishment is not an efficacious means of increasing net payoff at the group level (Dreber et al, 2008 ).”
Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment - An Experimental Study (2012, neutral): “A large and growing experimental literature in economics, starting with Fehr and Gächter (2000), demonstrates that the possibility of costly punishment facilitates increased cooperation in finite-horizon social dilemma situations such as prisoner’s dilemma and public good contribution games.”
Intelligent Data Analysis of Intelligent Systems (2010, background): “Much is understood about control mechanisms [ 19 ], [6], [7], [22], factors driving escalation of pair-wise contests [8], [9], [10], [11], the influence of third parties on conflict outcome through coalition formation [12], [13], audience [14], [15], reputation effects [16], and redirected aggressio”
The behavioural economics of climate change (2008, result): “The potential success of the latter strategy is also consistent with the experimental evidence of Dreber et al. (2008) , but there are, of course, large political obstacles that need to be solved before an effective system of sanctions can be agreed upon.”
On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey (2018, background): “Looking at table 11, we see that these papers (Dreber et al. 2008; Dal Bó and 61 Note that leniency and forgiveness in a finite signal environment must take very different forms from those in a continuous signal environment.”
Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World (2012, methodology): “Dreber Anna, David G. Rand, Drew Fudenberg, and Martin A. Nowak.”