Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending

By Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Ross Levine. 2006

561 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/101498073e6b3d2778c0d1eb877ca8fae0820e4b

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Citations in the corpus

Supervisory Effectiveness and Bank Risk (2011, methodology): “An alternative would be to use principal component analysis as in Beck et al. (2006).”
Bank Concentration and Fragility. Impact and Mechanics (2005, background): “Indeed, a growing body of evidence suggests that strengthening official supervisory power can actually increase corruption in lending and reduce banking system efficiency (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2006; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine 2004).”
Regulations, competition and bank risk-taking in transition countries (2008, methodology): “Banks that do not fail are usually the more efficient bank, which effectively have lower costs in producing the same outputs (Beck et al., 2006).”
Economic uncertainty and bank risk: Evidence from emerging economies (2020, unknown): “Similar to the practice of Beck et al. (2013), we adopt a”
Bank Regulations are Changing: For Better or Worse? (2008, methodology): “Beck et al. (2006) show that sound political and legal systems reduce the pernicious effects of official supervisory power, but they never find that empowering official 11 supervisors significantly reduces corruption in lending.”
The Role of Firm-Specific Incentives and Country Factors in Explaining Voluntary IAS Adoptions: Evidence from Private Firms (2008, result): “14However, it is worth noting that prior studies employingWBES survey data have failed to detect any systematic bias in sample firms responding to the survey (Beck et al., 2005a, 2005b, 2006).”
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth (2005, unknown): “See Beck et al. (2002) and many others.”
Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows (2011, methodology): “Following the literature (e.g. Beck et al., 2006), we conduct two tests to assess the appropriateness of the instruments.”
Bank Governance, Regulation, and Risk Taking (2009, unknown): “Based on Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003, 2006) and Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006), we use legal origin and the religious composition of each country as instruments for bank regulation.”
Corporate Social Responsibility and Credit Ratings (2013, methodology): “1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003) and use an ordered probit model instead of the standard linear regression model (OLS) as proposed by Greene (2000).(6) The results are presented in Table 6.”
Regulatory Arbitrage and Cross-Border Bank Acquisitions: Regulatory Arbitrage and Cross-Border Bank Acquisitions (2015, unknown): “Following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006), we also use the percentage of years since 1776 that a country has been independent; countries that have been independent for a longer period of time may have been able to adopt regulations that are more beneficial for economic development.”