Regulations, competition and bank risk-taking in transition countries
By Maria‐Eleni K. Agoraki, Matthaios D. Delis, Fotios Pasiouras. 2008
659 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e2a04ccc4692c547eaa0c4c2d8a870b3be8bd19d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- J. Klomp
- Jakob de Haan
- Amine Tarazi
- Wenxuan Hou
- Matthaios D. Delis
- B. Jeon
- Wahyoe Soedarmono
- F. Machrouh
In Finance
- J. Klomp
- Jakob de Haan
- Iftekhar Hasan
- Amine Tarazi
- Matthaios D. Delis
- B. Jeon
- Ji (George) Wu
- Minghua Chen
Citations in the corpus
- Bank competition, crisis and risk taking: Evidence from emerging markets in Asia (2013, positive): “Following Agoraki et al. (2009), SDROA and SDROE at time t are both calculated on the basis of observations of ROA and ROE, respectively, from time t to t – 2 (a”
- Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence (2014, result): “Using the Lerner index as a proxy for bank market power, Jiménez et al. (2013), Turk-Ariss (2010) and Agoraki et al. (2011) obtain similar results for Spain, 60 developing countries, and the transition economies from Central and Eastern European countries, respectively.”
- Bank Competition and Financial Stability: Much Ado About Nothing? (2015, neutral): “…the share of market entry restrictions or governance (e.g. Cihak et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2006 a,b; Beck et al., 2013; Anginer et al., 2014; Agoraki et al., 2011), ownership controls, i.e., foreign and state bank ownership (e.g. Bazzana and Yaldiz, 2010; Berger et al., 2009; De Nicolò…”
- Bank competition and financial stability in Asia Pacific (2014, neutral): “…Nicol´o et al. (2003), Beck et al. (2006a), Boyd et al. (2006), Yeyati and Micco (2007), Berger et al. (2009), Schaech and Cihak (2008), Schaeck et al. (2009), Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), Behr et al. (2010), Turk-Ariss (2010), Agoraki et al. (2011), Soedarmon et al. (2011), and Liu et al. (2012).”
- Bank ownership, regulation and efficiency: Perspectives from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region (2017, positive): “Moreover, activity restrictions can reduce the possibilities of risk diversification and the involvement of non-interest income related activities (Agoraki et al. 2011), leading to a decline in overall bank efficiency.”
- Banking risk and regulation: Does one size fit all? (2012, positive): “Barth et al. (2004) argue that bank regulation and supervision is affected by the general policy stance of the government and reflects national differences in legal and political systems (see also Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2010). To check for potential endogeneity of bank regulation and supervi”
- Economic uncertainty and bank risk: Evidence from emerging economies (2020, positive): “3.5 Financial regulations and others How the level of banks’ riskiness is affected by the scope and extent of financial regulatory rules has been studied in many earlier research (e.g., Laeven and Levine (2009) and Agoraki et al. (2011)).”
- Banking supervision and nonperforming loans: a cross-country analysis (2009, background): “Recently, using data from the Central and Eastern European banking sectors over the period 1998-2005, Agoraki et al. (2009), suggest that banks with market power tend to take on lower credit risk and have a lower probability of default.”
- Supervisory Effectiveness and Bank Risk (2011, background): “The fact that risk tends to persist and thus will deviate from equilibrium in the short run constitutes another element of potential bias in estimating risk equations (for a discussion, see Agoraki et al., 2009).”
- Market power, revenue diversification and bank stability: Evidence from selected South Asian countries (2012, methodology): “To address the simultaneous relationship between bank market power and income from nontraditional activities, we employ GMM estimators developed for dynamic panel models by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).”
- Political Institutions and Bank Risk-Taking Behavior (2015, neutral): “…are based on data from World Bank surveys on bank regulations Page 12 of 44 conducted in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011, following recent studies (Agoraki et al. 2011; Ashraf et al. 2016b) I use information from the survey conducted in 1999 for bank observations over the year 2000, from 2003…”
- Institutional development and bank stability: Evidence from transition countries (2014, result): “Third, this paper is also closely related to some of the literature on banking institutions in transition economies (e.g., Weill, 2003; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005a, 2005b; Haselmann and Wachtel, 2007, 2010; Agoraki et al., 2011; Berger et al., 2009; Haselmann et al., 2010; Fang et al”
- Bank Regulation, the Quality of Institutions, and Banking Risk in Emerging and Developing Countries: An Empirical Analysis (2014, methodology): “(2006) and Agoraki et al. (2011), indicators of asset quality, capitalization and market structure are more informative as an indicator of banking risk compared to indicators of profitability, efficiency and management qualities.”