Bank Governance, Regulation, and Risk Taking

By Luc Laeven, Ross Levine. 2009

3,304 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5e34d62b963a4bae1fd2d1c070da70888632057d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

  1. Phil Molyneux
  2. F. González
  3. Jakob de Haan
  4. Thorsten Beck
  5. Amine Tarazi
  6. Iftekhar Hasan
  7. Peterson K. Ozili
  8. Chen Lin

In Finance

  1. Iftekhar Hasan
  2. Phil Molyneux
  3. Jakob de Haan
  4. F. González
  5. Matthaios D. Delis
  6. J. Klomp
  7. Fotios Pasiouras
  8. Luc Laeven

Citations in the corpus