Bank Governance, Regulation, and Risk Taking
By Luc Laeven, Ross Levine. 2009
3,304 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5e34d62b963a4bae1fd2d1c070da70888632057d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Phil Molyneux
- F. González
- Jakob de Haan
- Thorsten Beck
- Amine Tarazi
- Iftekhar Hasan
- Peterson K. Ozili
- Chen Lin
In Finance
- Iftekhar Hasan
- Phil Molyneux
- Jakob de Haan
- F. González
- Matthaios D. Delis
- J. Klomp
- Fotios Pasiouras
- Luc Laeven
Citations in the corpus
- Role of Islamic banks in Indonesian banking industry: an empirical exploration (2020, methodology): “Measurement of Stability For measuring stability, we use the Z-score, as suggested and used in the banking literature (see, for instance, Lepetit, Nys, Rous and Terazi 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009; and Cihak and Hesse, 2007, 2010).”
- Ownership Structure and Risk in Publicly Held and Privately Owned Banks (2011, background): “dispersion matters when assessing the relationship between ownership structure and bank risk/profitability (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Shehzad et al., 2010) by examining ownership”
- The Relationship between Liquidity Risk and Credit Risk in Banks (2014, methodology): “As the regular score is highly skewed we apply the natural logarithm to the Z-score following Laeven and Levine (2009) and Houston et al. (2010).”
- Institutional development and bank stability: Evidence from transition countries (2014, methodology): “The inverse Z-score can be used to approximate a bank’s probability of default (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Delis et al., 2012; Goetz, 2012; Jiménez et al., 2013).”
- Banking risk and regulation: Does one size fit all? (2012, neutral): “Shezhad et al. (2010) and Laeven and Levine (2009) find that ownership concentration significantly affects loan quality and bank capitalization.”
- Corporate Ownership Structure and the Choice Between Bank Debt and Public Debt (2013, neutral): “Previous studies (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Lin et al., 2012) suggest that the initial average ownership structure in a firm’s industry is a reasonable instrument for the firm’s ownership structure, because an individual firm’s ownership structure is correlated with its industry average but it…”
- Bank Risk-Taking, Securitization, Supervision and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from the Euro Area and the U.S. Lending Standards (2011, neutral): “regulation, and supervision differ in each country and, as shown for example by Laeven and Levine (2009), these factors affect bank (loan) risk-taking.”
- The Influence of Board Composition on Sustainable Development Disclosure (2017, background): “…their human capital against short-term oriented investors and manage their risk through investment and finance strategies (Barry et al., 2011; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009), but also through higher level transparency and CSR involvement (Ghoul et al., 2011; Gill, 2008; Salama et…”
- Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital (2016, background): “When bank equity is held by outside investors with high risk preferences or concentrated ownership, it may increase bank risk taking (Laeven and Levine 2009).”
- The impact of bank capital, bank liquidity and credit risk on profitability in postcrisis period: A comparative study of US and Asia (2019, background): “…Jacques and Nigro (1997), Rime (2001), Philip Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Berger (1995), Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey (1997), Färe, Grosskopf, and Weber* (2004), Laeven and Levine (2009), Altunbas, Carbo, Gardener, and Molyneux (2007), which focused on bank capital, risk and profitability.”
- Financial Development in 205 Economies, 1960 to 2010 (2013, neutral): “…to the probability of a financial institution’s insolvency, that is, the probability that the value of its assets becomes lower than the value of its debt [see, for example, Boyd and Runkle (1993); Beck et al. (2006); Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008); Laeven and Levine (2009); Čihák and Hesse (2010)].”
- The Risk Sensitivity of Capital Requirements: Evidence from an International Sample of Large Banks* (2013, methodology): “First, we use an index of capital regulation as used in Laeven and Levine (2009) to describe the regulatory approaches to assessing and verifying the amount of capital at risk in a bank.”