Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions

By Dirk Hackbarth. 2008

535 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0b0bb146f28c9c42b3f97f5ae2c2dc88c982c1b1

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Citations in the corpus

The Bright Side of Managerial Over-Optimism (2016, methodology): “, Benabou, and Tirole, 2002; Compte and Postlewaite, 2004; Van den Steen, 2004; Hackbarth, 2008; Gervais, Heaton, and Odean, 2011), little empirical work exists on this topic. Second, we present evidence consistent with the comparative statics and ancillary predictions of the economic over-optimism ”
Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial Misreporting (2012, unknown): “Hackbarth (2008) generates the same prediction if overconfidence causes an optimistic assessment of investment payoffs but a reverse pecking order preference if overconfidence causes an optimistic assessment of the firm’s cost of capital to fund investment.”
CEO Optimism and Incentive Compensation (2014, unknown): “Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2011) provide evidence regarding the influence on CEO turnover, and Hackbarth (2008, 2009) examines the implications for capital structure decisions.”
Corporate Policies of Republican Managers (2014, background): “Studies such as Opler and Titman (1994) and Hackbarth (2008) show that financial conservatism could manifest itself as lower levels of corporate leverage.”
Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting (2011, background): “…product markets, Englmaier (2006) shows that overconfidence commits agents to be more aggressive, making their firm more profitable in the process.4 Hackbarth (2008) finds that managerial overconfidence leads to greater debt financing and that overconfidence, by acting as a commitment device, can…”
Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Structure: New Evidence (2014, unknown): “…between shareholders and debtholders, such as underinvestment (e.g., Ju and Ou-Yang, 2006; Titman and Tsyplakov, 2007; Sundaresan and Wang, 2007; Hackbarth, 2008; Pawlina, 2010; Dang, 2011; Hackbarth and Mauer, 2012) and asset substitution (e.g., Leland, 1998; Ju and Ou-Yang, 2006; Sundaresan…”
CEO Overconfidence and Financial Crisis: Evidence from Bank Lending and Leverage (2015, unknown): “Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Hackbarth (2008), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), and Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) have drawn attention to how CEOs and their character traits affect investment policy in industrial firms.”
Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt (2007, background): “Hackbarth (2007) presents a model in which an overconfident manager chooses higher debt levels than does a rational manager.”
National Culture and Corporate Cash Holdings around the World (2015, background): “Hackbarth (2004), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007), and Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2007)”
Corporate Financial Policies with Overconfident Managers (2005, unknown): “In Table 5, we present tobit estimates of (12) using Longholder to proxy for ∆.”