Altruistic and Joy‐of‐Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior

By David C. Ribar, M. Wilhelm. Journal of Political Economy, 2002

404 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/09cf56b1728c52ae7f39309d7ecd4c8350139037

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Citations in the corpus

Measuring Altruistic Behavior in Surveys: The All‐Or‐Nothing Dictator Game (2007, neutral): “Dictator games and charitable giving have been studied by economists interested in the role of altruism in human behavior (Andreoni 1990; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Ribar and Wilhelm 2002).”
Government Support and Charitable Donations: A Meta-Analysis of the Crowding-out Hypothesis (2016, background): “It has also been argued that the effect varies with the level of government support (Borgonovi 2006; Brooks 2000b, 2003b), the salience of the tax (Eckel, Grossman, and Johnston 2005) and the number of other donors (Ribar and Wilhelm 2002).”
Who gives what and when? A scenario study of intentions to give time and money (2010, positive): “Obviously, the more time or money is requested, the less likely that a contribution will be made (Dovidio et al., 1991; Komorita and Parks, 1994; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965).”
An experimental test of warm glow giving (2008, methodology): “ Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) attempt to reconcile the differences found in field and lab data.”
The Development and Validation of the Motives to Donate Scale (2018, background): “It has long been recognized that charitable giving can be motivated by the altruistic impulses of givers, and this motive is highly prevalent in the literature (Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002).”
Why Do People Give? Testing Pure and Impure Altruism (2014, positive): “Understanding why begins with the asymptotic comparative statics of impure altruism: under fairly weak conditions on preferences (concave utility and strictly operative warm glow at all levels of G) as giving‐by‐others G‐i → ∞ ⇒ q1 + q2 → 1; that is, the impure altruism model converges to a model wh”
Does Public Policy Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods (2001, positive): “In a recent analysis based on panel data on contributions to foreign aid, Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) conclude that crowding-out effects are very small; at most 23 cent per dollar of government spending, but in most versions of their econometric model not significantly different from zero.”
The Economics of Museums (2003, background): “Second, it may be that 2 2 Many studies show that grants which match donations increase willingness to donate (see further Chapter 35 by Netzer and Chapter 36 by Schuster in this volume); see also List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) and Ribar and Wilhelm (2002).”
Mixed feelings: Theories of and evidence on giving (2010, background): “…and negative), I follow Occam’s razor and adopt the simpler formulation, at least one specification of which, as it turns out, can reconcile all of the experimental evidence on allocations and affective motivation. indeed sometimes negligible (e.g., Abrams and Schmitz 1978, Ribar and Wilhelm 2002).”
Are church and state substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 welfare reform (2005, background): “…that might affect the size of crowd out are whether or not church members get a " warm glow " from privately providing the public good [Andreoni, 1989], the size of the population of potential donors [Ribar and Wilhelm, 2002], and actions taken by the local (or state) government [Steinberg, 1987].”
Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment (2007, neutral): “This assumption is supported in the empirical literature: People’s donations are not completely crowded out by government contributions (e.g., Ribar and Wilhelm 2002), nor do people reduce their contribution when the contributions of others increase (e.g., Frey and Meier 2004a). people compensate…”