THE STRATEGY/GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FIT RELATIONSHIP: THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN FRANCHISING ARRANGEMENTS

By Xiaoli Yin, Edward J. Zajac. 2004

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Beyond institutional voids: Business groups, incomplete markets, and organizational form (2015, methodology): “Under these conditions, prior works (cf. Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Leiblein and Madsen, 2009; Yin and Zajac, 2004) have recommended the use of random effects specification over a fixed effects model.”
The fit between product market strategy and business model: implications for firm performance (2008, background): “It has subsequently been revived through a closer empirical examination of dynamics and causality (Amburgey and Dacin, 1994) and calls for an extension of the analysis to various forms of strategy and structure that had not previously been considered (Nadler and Tushman, 1997; Yin and Zajac, 2004).”
Dual Distribution and Intangible Firm Value: Franchising in Restaurant Chains (2006, unknown): “Owner-managers of market-based channels follow complex strategies and are more responsive to market changes than are bureaucratic, vertically integrated channels (Yin and Zajac 2004).”
Capitalizing on Franchisee Autonomy: Relational Forms of Governance as Controls in Idiosyncratic Franchise Dyads* (2008, background): “…cheating imperil the value, which can be derived from granting autonomy to store-owners in terms of leveraging the agents’ specific knowledge (Yin and Zajac 2004; Sorenson and Sørensen 2001; Bradach 1997) and enhancing their satisfaction (Schul, Little, and Pride 1985), and thus, motivation…”