Outside Directors with a Stake: The Linchpin in Improving Governance

By Donald C. Hambrick, E. M. Jackson. 2000

151 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0692bd0e1f8663cb5f707b440eed440f5262e08b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Igor Filatotchev
2. Yung-chih Lien
3. Young Kyun Chang
4. Won‐yong Oh
5. Vilmos F. Misangyi
6. Abhijith G. Acharya
7. Morela Hernandez
8. Jenifer Piesse

In Finance

1. Young Kyun Chang
2. Won‐yong Oh
3. Yung-chih Lien
4. Abhijith G. Acharya
5. Vilmos F. Misangyi
6. Morela Hernandez
7. Igor Filatotchev
8. Jenifer Piesse

Citations in the corpus

• Managerial Risk Taking (2016, unknown): “Hambrick and Jackson (2000) document the complex relationships between compensation and monitoring that can arise among the corporate elite and, ultimately, their effect on managers’ risk taking.”
• Corporate Governance and Performance in Publicly Listed, Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from Taiwan (2005, background): “Geletkanycz, Boyd, and Finkelstein (2001) associate board ownership with strategic power, whereas Hambrick and Jackson (2000) indicate that share ownership not only creates financial incentives for independent directors but also increases their identification with the company, making them more…”
• Promoting Stewardship Behavior in Organizations: A Leadership Model (2008, background): “Individual actors that identify with organizational values are more likely to act in protection of those values; thus, identification with the company, serves to align the interests of individuals with organizational goals, fostering stewardship (Davis et al., 1997; Hambrick and Jackson, 2000).”
• The Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Social Responsibility: Empirical Evidence from Korea (2011, background): “ship of the stock is positively associated with the firm’s financial performance (Hambrick and Jackson 2000).”
• Substitutes or Complements? A Configurational Examination of Corporate Governance Mechanisms (2014, methodology): “In setting the calibration thresholds, we again followed theory—we sought to capture the amount of the individual’s net worth at stake (Hambrick & Jackson, 2000)—as well as extant substantive knowledge.”
• Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Stock Price Crashes (2016, unknown): “[Hambrick and Jackson (2000)].”