Multiple versus Single Banking Relationships: Theory and Evidence
By E. Detragiache, P. Garella, Luigi Guiso. 2000
774 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/061d74a7c194a98e72197ab185fe0f46a3926b3a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Allen N. Berger
- A. Presbitero
- A. Zazzaro
- L. Gambacorta
- Rafael Repullo
- José María Liberti
- Philipp Schnabl
- Mark J. Garmaise
In Finance
- Allen N. Berger
- A. Zazzaro
- A. Presbitero
- L. Gambacorta
- Philipp Schnabl
- Rafael Repullo
- José María Liberti
- Efraim Benmelech
Citations in the corpus
- Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short-term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly (2004, result): “It is interesting to note that both Detragiache et al. and Ongena and Smith view this result as evidence against the models that they were testing, in which multiple lenders are most useful when the costs of bankruptcy are low. The results in all of these papers are consistent with my model, but mor”
- The Supply-Side Determinants of Loan Contract Strictness (2012, background): “Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) also argue that smaller bank groups subject the borrower to lender liquidity risk, resulting in early liquidation of some projects.”
- Do Liquidation Values Affect Financial Contracts? Evidence from Commercial Loan Contracts and Zoning Regulation (2005, background): “The existence of inefficient liquidation or “fire sales” has been documented [Pulvino 1998,1999; Stromberg 2000], but not the interplay between ex ante liquidation value and financial structure at the time the contract is set.”
- The duration of bank relationships (2001, neutral): “Detragiache et al. (2000), Ongena and”
- Endogenous Product Differentiation in Credit Markets: What do Borrowers Pay for? (2005, neutral): “See also Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse 2See Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000).”
- Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring (2004, neutral): “…relationships tends to increase with firm size, also small and medium enterprises (SMEs) borrow from more than one bank at some point in their life cycle as reported for countries like the US, Italy and Portugal (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Detragiache et al., 2000; and Farinha and Santos, 2002).”
- Why Do Loans Contain Covenants? Evidence from Lending Relationships (2017, neutral): “against an adverse selection problem (Detragiache et al., 2000).”
- Lending Relationships and Loan Contract Terms (2011, neutral): “This is indeed what we find - for the high syndicate moral hazard group relationship loans are 11 to 19 bps lower compared to matched non-relationship loans and statistically significant.(31) Finally, a typical loan provides a number of other contractual ways in which a lender can impact the “cost” ”
- Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis (2013, neutral): “Second, multiple lending is a long-standing characteristic of the bank- rm relationship in Italy (Foglia et al. 1998, Detragiache et al. 2000).”
- Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting (2010, neutral): “The size of the firm measures the lender’s access to reliable financial information about the firm (Eisenbeis (1996)). Liberti and Mian (2006) find evidence that firm size as well as loan size determine the hierarchical level within the bank that must approve the terms of the loan.”
- Winners or Losers? The Effects of Banking Consolidation on Corporate Borrowers (2007, neutral): “small number of lenders might not ( Detragiache, Garella and Guiso, 2000 ).”
- The Response of Firms' Investment and Financing to Adverse Cash Flow Shocks: The Role of Bank Relationships (2006, positive): “Detragiache et al. (2000) develop a model in which firms choose multiple relationships to avoid being denied refinancing of long term projects when their bank faces liquidity problems.”