Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis

By Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas, L. Gambacorta, P. Mistrulli. 2013

571 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8fb566a6fa68689e7b848cd43cab5b2ed792ade7

Citations in the corpus

• Internal Capital Markets in Times of Crisis: The Benefit of Group Affiliation* (2019, unknown): “A number of recent studies find that credit supply by distressed banks was reduced in Italy during both the 2007–08 global financial crisis as well as the more recent euro area sovereign debt crisis (e.g., Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010; Bolton et al., 2016; Cingano, Manaresi, and Sette, 2016; Baldu”
• Bank lending in uncertain times (2020, unknown): “[20] Bolton, Patrick, Freixas, Xavier, Gambacorta, Leonardo and Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, 2016.”
• Banking and Trading (2012, unknown): “Bank provides funding insurance through credit lines (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002) and—importantly—through implicit commitments to customers in local markets, particularly during crises (Bolton et al., 2013; Sette and Gobbi, 2015).”
• Who Supplies PPP Loans (and Does It Matter)? Banks, Relationships, and the COVID Crisis (2020, unknown): “, as shown in Bolton et al. (2016), relationship banks are more willing to stay with their borrowers during bad times), ours documents a less conventional but important reason (i.”
• Bank Capital and Lending Relationships: Bank Capital and Lending Relationships (2017, unknown): “Bolton et al. (2013) show evidence of a similar mechanism, with relationship banks holding more capital to insure their borrowers, but my paper is the first to show that this mechanism affects the ex ante matching of banks and firms.”
• Does credit reporting lead to a decline in relationship lending? Evidence from information sharing technology (2018, unknown): “Relationship lenders often continue financing firms during crises or unprofitable periods, because losses can be recovered in subsequent contracts (Petersen and Rajan 1995; Bharath et al. 2011; Bolton et al. 2016).”
• Specialization in Bank Lending: Evidence from Exporting Firms (2015, unknown): “The extensive margin results suggest that the documented market-specific advantages are distinct from the firm-specific advantage conferred by proprietary information gathered through the lending process (see Bernanke, 1983; James, 1987; Hoshi et al., 1990; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Petersen and Raj”