The Supply-Side Determinants of Loan Contract Strictness

By J. Murfin. 2012

377 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d4f2f3d30e98c224ce7e59a722ca2f6ddc63ff37

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Olivier Darmouni
2. Gabriel Chodorow-reich
3. Sudipto Shankar Dasgupta
4. Matthew C. Plosser
5. Stephan Luck
6. Peter R. Demerjian
7. E. Owens
8. John E. Core

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Olivier Darmouni
2. Matthew C. Plosser
3. Stephan Luck
4. Sudipto Shankar Dasgupta
5. John E. Core
6. Gabriel Chodorow-reich
7. Inna Abramova
8. E. Owens

In Finance

1. Olivier Darmouni
2. Gabriel Chodorow-reich
3. Matthew C. Plosser
4. Stephan Luck
5. Sudipto Shankar Dasgupta
6. Peter R. Demerjian
7. E. Owens
8. John E. Core

Citations in the corpus

• The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting (2015, positive): “Several studies have shown that this distance appears small based on various norms (e.g., Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Demiroglu and James, 2010; Murfin, 2012).”
• Reputation and Loan Contract Terms: The Role of Principal Customers (2016, methodology): “riskier borrowers receive tighter covenants (e.g., Demiroglu and James, 2010; Murfin, 2012).”
• Do Firms Engage in Risk-Shifting? Empirical Evidence (2016, neutral): “Additionally, borrowers may be particularly concerned with their reputation with a given bank, particularly if they are locked in to a banking relationship and have limited other debt financing options (Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990)).”
• Why Do Loans Contain Covenants? Evidence from Lending Relationships (2017, neutral): “term issuer rating as well as a firm’s access to the commercial paper market (as evidenced by a short-term rating of A-2 or better (Murfin, 2010)) as proxies for the firm’s access to public debt markets.”
• Measuring the Probability of Financial Covenant Violation in Private Debt Contracts (2016, positive): “20 To compute PVIOL M , we closely follow Murfin’s (2012) implementation.”
• Bank liquidity provision across the firm size distribution (2020, background): “Due to data limitations, much of this debate has concerned large firms and the role of loan covenants (Roberts and Sufi, 2009; Chodorow-Reich and Falato, Forthcoming; Ippolito et al., 2019; Murfin, 2012).”
• Institutional Investor Attention and Firm Disclosure (2020, result): “6 This approach is akin to recent work exploiting shocks in one part of a bank’s portfolio to study how monitoring changes for the bank’s other clients (e.g., Gopalan et al. 2011, Murfin 2012).”
• Sustainable Shadow Banking (2013, background): “4 For evidence of a deterioration in loan underwriting standards see Murfin (2012) and Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2012).”
• Bank Capital and Lending Relationships: Bank Capital and Lending Relationships (2017, neutral): “2010 ; Fahlenbrach , Prilmeier , and Stulz 2012 ) , some use book equity from the bank holding company ( Murfin 2012 ; Jayaranam and Thakor 2014 ) , some use tangible book equity and risk - adjusted regulatory ratios from the holding company ( Beltratti and Stulz 2012 ; Demirguc - Kunt ,…”