Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short-term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly

By Douglas W. Diamond. 2004

260 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e4d4b7722a1cb4dc1316b75de696a396eaad1150

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Citations in the corpus

How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans (2007, unknown): “Maturity can be particularly useful in such environments because shortening the loan mitigates risk even absent wellfunctioning legal regimes and/or well-developed institutions (Diamond (2004)).”
Do Debt Contract Enforcement Costs Affect Financing and Asset Structure (2014, unknown): “To the extent that contract enforcement is more costly in India as compared to in the U.S., the higher value of Short1 among Indian firms offers strong preliminary evidence consistent with Diamond (2004).”
Do Liquidation Values Affect Financial Contracts? Evidence from Commercial Loan Contracts and Zoning Regulation (2005, methodology): “We employ commercial zoning regulation to capture the flexibility of a property’s permitted uses as a measure of an asset’s redeployability or value in its next best use.”
Do Banks Value the Eco-Friendliness of Firms’ in Their Corporate Lending Decision? Some Empirical Evidence (2012, background): “Thus, the lenders prefer short-term debt that allows them to review their lending decision (Diamond, 2004).”
Does bankruptcy law improve the fate of distressed firms? The role of credit channels (2020, result): “In this regard, the results are supportive of Diamond (2004)’s “lender passivity” argument according to which a decrease in contract enforcement costs should have, ceteris paribus, a dual effect.”
Leverage, Moral Hazard and Liquidity (2010, unknown): “Diamond and Rajan (2001) present a similar argument to Diamond (2004).”
Firm exit after distress: differentiating between bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation and M&A (2011, unknown): “…liquidation (Fleming and Moon 1995), especially when the low leverage is associated with a small number of creditors (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996; Diamond 2004).7 With low leverage, the liquidation value of a firm’s assets is more likely to be sufficient to compensate for the outstanding…”
Rollover Risk and Market Freezes (2010, unknown): “There exist agency-based explanations in the literature (for example, Flannery, 1986, Diamond, 1989, 1991, 2004, Calomiris and Kahn, 1991, and Diamond and Rajan, 2001a, 2001b) for the existence of short-term debt as optimal nancing in such settings.”
Lending Relationships and Loan Contract Terms (2011, unknown): “Collateral is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan was secured and 0 otherwise.(34) We control for loan amount, maturity, leverage, tangibility of assets, market-to-book, loan concentration (measured as the fraction of the loan size to the sum of existing debt plus the loan size), and default ”
Determinants of Vertical Integration: Financial Development and Contracting Costs (2009, background): “1 neurs need collateral in order to obtain nancing (Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Legros and Newman, 1996), and they may need to rely on bank nancing (Diamond and Rajan, 2005, Diamond, 2004).”