The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008

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Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012, methodology): “Following on from Theorem 4, we assume that a t = a 8 t. Short-termism is broadly dened to encompass any action that increases current returns at the expense of future returns. This denition includes real decisions such as scrapping positiveNPV investments (see, e.g., Stein (1988)) or taking negat”
Financial crisis and bank executive incentive compensation (2014, background): “In an insightful recent paper, Bebchuk et al. (2010) study the compensation structure of the top executives in Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and conclude, “…given the structure of executives' payoffs, the possibility that risk-taking decisions were influenced by incentives should not be…”
Financial Expertise of the Board, Risk Taking, and Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies (2014, unknown): “For instance, a fair amount of attention has been given to the incentives of bank management in the run-up to and during the 2007–2008 financial crisis (see Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010), and Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian (2010)).”