Rent-seeking and resource booms

By J. Baland, P. Francois. 2000

406 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/04c2a2a521e97beae07d4a13e64b0314a9cac7a9

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. F. van der ploeg
2. E. Papyrakis
3. Erwin H. Bulte
4. Paul Collier
5. Donghyeon Kim
6. S. Lin
7. Ragnar Torvik
8. V. Daniele

In Information Systems

1. V. Daniele
2. S. Lin
3. Donghyeon Kim
4. Paul Collier
5. S. Bhattacharyya
6. Erwin H. Bulte
7. Ragnar Torvik
8. Benedikt Goderis

Citations in the corpus

• Predator or prey? Parasitic enterprises in economic development (2003, background): “2 See also Andvig (1997), Grossman (1998), Chand and Moene (1999), and Baland and Francois (2000) .”
• Environment, Human Development and Economic Growth (2008, methodology): “[8] and [9] are introduced in order to capture both chain A and chain B of the EG-HD relationships, as claimed in Boozer et al.”
• Escaping the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease? When and Why Norway Caught up with and Forged ahead of Its Neighbors (2006, background): “Baland and Francois (2000) argue that the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship.”
• Natural Resources and Economic Development: New Panel Evidence (2015, background): “1999; Gylfason 2001), lead to rent-seeking (Baland and Francois 2000; Torvik 2002), increase incidences of social conflict and civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Hodler 2006; Olsson 2007), or undermine institutional quality (Ades and Tella 1999; Acemoglu et al.”
• Optimal Dutch disease (2005, background): “3 Other explanations include theories of rent-seeking (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Baland and Francois, 2000; Torvik, 2002; Mehlum et al., 2002) and political economy theories of why resource abundance invites bad policy choices (Ross, 1999, 2001; Robinson et al., 2002; Damania…”
• Institutions and the Resource Curse (2006, neutral): “For rent-seeking models with demand composition efiects, see Baland and Francois (2000) and Torvik (2002).”
• Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare (2002, methodology): “As in Baland and Francois (2000), the profit for both entrepreneurs and rent seekers increases when the size of the market increases.”
• Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum (2008, background): “Resource rents may invite non-productive lobbying and rent seeking, as in Lane and Tornell (1996), Tornell and Lane (1999), Baland and Francois (2000), Torvik (2002), and Wick and Bulte (2006).”
• Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption (2010, background): “Our paper therefore is related to the literature which argues that natural resources may lower the economic performance because they foster rent-seeking activities (e.g., Lane and Tornell, 1996, Tornell and Lane, 1999, Baland and Francois, 2000, and Torvik, 2002).”