Institutions and the Resource Curse

By Halvor Mehlum, K. Moene, Ragnar Torvik. 2006

2,949 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Development, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fe5906f64cd2d188682f0000c23809ae3efdbea9

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Citations in the corpus

A theory of entrepreneurship and institutional uncertainty (2017, positive): “Without high-quality supporting institutions (e.g., Mehlum et al., 2006), entrepreneurship can be unproductive or even destructive, thereby impairing economic performance and growth (Baumol, 1990).”
Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum (2008, background): “Mehlum et al. (2006) argue that this problem only occurs in countries 26 Aguirre and Calderón (2005) show that the effect of real exchange-rate misalignment is non-linear: large overvaluations and very large undervaluations reduce growth, while moderate undervaluation raises growth.”
The Resource Curse Exorcised: Evidence from a Panel of Countries (2015, background): “Another form treats institutions as exogenous to resource wealth, and the interaction between resources and institutions explains the divergent outcomes of resource-rich countries (Robinson et al 2006, Mehlum et al 2006, Sarr et al 2011).”
Is a negative correlation between resource abundance and growth sufficient evidence that there is a “resource curse”? (2011, background): “Mehlum et al. (2006) argue that in a specification like (22), if resource abundance is measured relative to GDP, all else equal, economies with high GDP would appear resource scarce while low GDP economies would appear resource abundant. period t.24 We approximate rates of growth by log annual…”
Natural Resources and Local Communities: Evidence from a Peruvian Gold Mine (2013, background): “The existing empirical literature suggests that abundance of natural resources may fail to improve living standards, or even hinder economic performance, specially in the presence of bad institutions (Sachs and Warner, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Mehlum et al., 2006). Most of this evidence, howeve”
The Resource Curse and its Potential Reversal (2013, methodology): “With respect to the composite measure of institutional quality (used in Mehlum et al. (2006) and in Boschini et al. (2007)) there are several reasons for trying to understand which parts of this are driving the result, as well as to what extent the interaction effect varies across types of…”
Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria (2014, neutral): “…the analysis of the Nigerian case also contributes to a better understanding of political incentives in resource-rich countries – and therefore of the 'natural resource curse' (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Mehlum et al , 2006; Robinson et al, 2006; Vicente, 2006, 2007b; Collier and Goderis, 2007).”
Breaking the resource curse: Transparency in the natural resource sector and the extractive industries transparency initiative (2014, positive): “Mehlum et al. (2006) ﬁ nd that resource abundance only affects growth rates negatively when institutions are weak.”
Resource Rents, Redistribution, and Halving Global Poverty: The Resource Dividend (2011, background): “While I estimate its global impact, the RD is a national, not international policy, and in recent years versions have been proposed for Iraq (Birdsall & Subramanian, 2004; Palley, 2003), Nigeria (Sala-i-Martı́n & Subramanian, 2003), and Bolivia (Durán et al., 2007); Iran is in the process of adoptin”