Natural Resources, Democracy and Corruption

By S. Bhattacharyya, R. Hodler. 2010

660 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/905ca8f7dd64da133c7659bb363ef82a60a883e0

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Citations in the corpus

Rosewood of Madagascar: Between democracy and conservation (2010, background): “The United Nations (Joint UNEP / OCHA Environmental Team 2007, cited by GW and EIA 2009) and Birkinshaw and Randrianjanahary (2007) showed that hurricanes have had little effect on trees at Masoala, especially on large, long - lived individuals that are resilient and have survived many severe cyclon”
Pollution, Shadow Economy and Corruption: Theory and Evidence (2012, neutral): “This index of corruption is frequently used in the literature (e.g., Alesina and Weder, 2002; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010; Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; and Knack and Keefer, 1995).”
Oil and political survival (2013, background): “This leaves us with a sample 1See, e.g., Sachs and Warner (1995) on economic development, Ross (2001) on authoritarianism, Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) on corruption, and Collier and Hoe er (2004) on civil war.”
Public capital in resource rich economies: is there a curse? (2014, methodology): “A large literature suggests that the resource curse is conditional on the quality of institutions (e.g., Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010a,b).”
Definitions and dimensions of energy security: a literature review (2018, background): “Otherwise, if there is no questioning to those in power, the resources are highly probable to be a curse.(132,133) In other cases, other nations or governments decide to control the access to an energy resource by overthrowing current controllers or owners, starting a war against energy rich countri”
The Resource Curse: A Statistical Mirage? (2015, background): “It is commonly argued that natural-resource dependence creates market and institutional failures that induce slow economic growth (Matsuyama, 1992; Auty, 1994; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gylfason, 2001; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010).”
What Drives the Global Land Rush? (2011, positive): “From a substantive point of view, this ﬁnding resonates with evidence that, unless well-governed institutions exist to manage these resources, resource booms may fuel rent-seeking and corruption (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010) instead of development (Oechslin 2010).”
The evolution of the natural resource curse thesis: A critical literature survey (2017, background): “Drawing distinctions by political system, Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) suggest that natural resources only induce corruption in countries with enduring non-democratic regimes.”
Breaking the resource curse: Transparency in the natural resource sector and the extractive industries transparency initiative (2014, positive): “Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009) argue that depending on the level of democracy, resource rents tend to increase corruption, which not only decreases the effectiveness or the level of accountability of a government but can distort the economy as well.”
Natural Resources and Economic Development: New Panel Evidence (2015, methodology): “…there is also evidence of an economic curse (blessing) conditional on having poor (good) institutions (Mehlum et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2006; Boschini et al. 2007, 2013; Collier and Goderis 2007; Olsson 2007; Bulte and Damania 2008; Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010, 2014; Bjorvatn et al. 2012).”