Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case

By David Genesove, Wallace P. Mullin. 2001

288 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/03c74793bb1e05e8d72b98242c63239fd425dc2d

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Citations in the corpus

On the Workings of a Cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian Cement Industry ∗ (2006, background): “Genesove an Mullins (2001) discuss how rules and frequent meetings prevented unnecessary retaliations among the sugar cartel members and how they maintained a collusive price level.”
Collusion with Asymmetric Retailers: Evidence from a Gasoline Price-Fixing Case (2013, methodology): “In the Lysine cartel firms were assigned output levels, and a sales quota scheme was implemented in the citric acid cartel (see Harrington and Skrzypacz (2010), Connor (2001), and Levenstein and Suslow (2006) for studies of these cartels).”
Explaining the Clustering of International Expansion Moves: A Critical Test in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (2005, background): “Matching responses, in which a respondent executes the same strategic action as an attacker, are common because they signal commitment to defend the status quo without escalating rivalry (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Genesove & Mullin, 2001).”
Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline (2019, methodology): “While the literature has produced numerous policy-relevant insights, there remains an im portant yet uninformed question: in the absence of direct communication, how is collusion initiated? Indeed, the following quote from Green and Porter (1984) is still relevant today: “It is logically possible f”
The Geographies of Knowledge Transfers over Distance: Toward a Typology (2014, background): “On the other hand, such meetings might involve elements of collusion and may be directed toward illegal market practices, such as hidden price fixing (Genesove and Mullin, 2001).”
Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion (2009, unknown): “The category for agreeing to a punishment scheme is excluded since receiving a message of this type is highly correlated with sending a threat, making the standard errors imprecise due to colinearity.(29) Finally, because we are particularly interested in the effect of threats, the categories for im”
The Impact of Collusion on Price Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases (2006, background): “Another strategy is to reduce the variance of prices by homogenizing firms’ business practices as in the case of the Sugar Institute (Genesove and Mullin, 2001).”