Collusion with Asymmetric Retailers: Evidence from a Gasoline Price-Fixing Case

By Robert Clark, Jean-François Houde. 2013

138 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0af1820220b23fb51b240806f940fa65279bc9a9

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Daniel Ershov
2. S. Assad
3. Lei Xu
4. Robert Clark
5. Nicolas D B. Roos
6. David P. Byrne

In Marketing

1. Daniel Ershov
2. S. Assad
3. Lei Xu
4. Robert Clark
5. Nicolas D B. Roos
6. David P. Byrne

In Strategy and Management

1. Robert Clark

Citations in the corpus

• Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline (2019, background): “…this level of coordination is achieved despite: (1) stations setting prices simultaneously once each day; and (2) estimates of daily station-level price elasticity of demand on the order of 20 (Clark and Houde, 2013), which implies substantial business stealing incentives to undercut rivals.”
• EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF GASOLINE RETAILING: A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE (2013, unknown): “(2007), Davis (2010) and Erutku (2007) all consider empirically the belief that retail prices increase heading into weekends or holidays, which if true suggests at least to some consumers the existence of price fixing.”
• Algorithmic Pricing and Competition: Empirical Evidence from the German Retail Gasoline Market (2023, background): “The magnitudes of margin increases are consistent with previous estimates of the effects of coordination in the retail gasoline market (Clark and Houde 2013, 2014; Byrne and De Roos 2019).”