Is Grameen Lending Efficient? Repayment Incentives and Insurance in Village Economies

By A. Rai, Tomas Sjöström. 2004

187 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/02c8c14c049f3e2aa7c4f071fb13a6349a601a3c

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Citations in the corpus

Group Versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines (2006, unknown): “Finally, Rai and Sjostrom (2004) show that both individual and group liability alone can be dominated by a contract that elicits truthful revelation about the success of the peers’ project.”
Contract Structure, Risk Sharing and Investment Choice (2011, background): “While this mechanism has been widely credited with making it possible, indeed profitable, to lend to poor borrowers in poor countries, a growing literature critically explores the relative merits of joint versus individual liability.1 There have long been suspicions that peer monitoring may overcomp”
Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups (2009, unknown): “However, Sadoulet (2000) argues that “social collateral” induced by group liability is not sufficient to ensure high repayment rates.”
Microfinance Meets the Market (2008, background): “Subsequent contributions include Conning (1999) and Rai and Sjöström (2004).”
Microcredit Under the Microscope: What Have We Learned in the Past Two Decades, and What Do We Need to Know? (2013, background): “For example, in Besley & Coate’s environment, Rai & Sjöström (2004) show that a cross-reporting mechanism can implement the first best outcome as long as there is no collusion among the borrowers, but the joint liability mechanism cannot.”
Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders (2014, unknown): “2 See Siamwalla et al. (1990) for similar findings from Thailand.”
Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability (2005, background): “One interesting paper that does allow for side contracting and renegotiation possibilities is by Rai and Sjostrom (2003). They study a mechanism design problem with limited side contracting where the borrowers submit reports about each other to the bank. Rai and Sjostrom (2003) demonstrate that desp”