Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability
By Prabal Roy Chowdhury. 2005
174 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Management Information Systems
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/04d282e67e0842c1344ee7e84afec1f39536bbc9
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
In Economics and Econometrics
- Abhijit Banerjee
- G. Fischer
- Esther Duflo
- Benjamin Moll
- Dean S. Karlan
- Thorsten Beck
- Todd Schoellman
- Jonathan Zinman
In Management Information Systems
Citations in the corpus
- Group Versus Individual Liability: A Field Experiment in the Philippines (2006, unknown): “liability is not sufficient to ensure high repayment rates. Chowdhury (2005) develops a model that”
- Contract Structure, Risk Sharing and Investment Choice (2011, background): “16Among the numerous examples are Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994), Stiglitz (1990), Wydick (1999), Chowdhury (2005), Conning (2005), Armendariz (1999), and Madajewicz (2004).”
- Group versus Individual Liability: Long Term Evidence from Philippine Microcredit Lending Groups (2009, unknown): “The findings seem consistent with the model of Chowdhury (2005), where the removal of group liability has probably resulted in an increased monitoring and screening done by credit officers, although we did not find an increase in their workload.”
- Microcredit Under the Microscope: What Have We Learned in the Past Two Decades, and What Do We Need to Know? (2013, background): “From this perspective, microlending can be seen as an innovation in the technology of lending that leads to a large reduction in interest rates that result from this multiplier.2”
- Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups (2014, unknown): “Chowdhury (2005) develops a model that abstracts from adverse selection but shows that joint liability alone cannot mitigate an ex-ante moral hazard problem.”
- Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending (2009, unknown): “…information and intra-group monitoring leads to greater rates of repayment, is formalized in a large body of academic literature dealing with the optimal design of group lending agreements in the context of developing economies (Stiglitz 1990, Varian 1990, Chowdhury 2005, Besley and Coate 1995).”