Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective

By Jeffrey Milyo, D. Primo, T. Groseclose. Business and Politics, 2000

296 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy? (2008, background): “16See Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose (2000) and the discussion contained in section 5.1.”
Corporate Lobbying Revisited (2008, background): “…of corporate campaign contributions.1 Among others, Grier et al. (1994) examined the determinants of PAC contributions using 124 industries over five election cycles and found that industry concentration, government sales, regulation, antitrust indictments, and firm size were important variables.”
Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Political Risk: Measurement and Effects (2016, unknown): “…that firms may actively cultivate connections to politicians through lobbying, documenting that lobbying is pervasive in the US political system (Milyo et al. (2000)), engaged in mostly by large corporations and industry associations (De Figueiredo (2004); Ansolabehere et al. (2002); Richter…”
Political connections, SEC enforcement and accounting quality (2009, unknown): “The large percentage of contributions made to incumbents is consistent with firms using PAC contributions to buy access or special favors, rather than for ideological reasons (Milyo et al., 2000).”
Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, unknown): “Second, political connections can help firms gain access to legislators in the United States (e.g., Hall and Wayman 1990; Milyo et al. 2000).”