Deductive reasoning with factual, possible, and counterfactual conditionals

By Ruth M. J. Byrne, Alessandra Tasso. 1999

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Citations in the corpus

Counterfactual Thinking: From Logic to Morality (2017, background): “(e.g., Byrne & Tasso, 1999) If there had not been a circle on the blackboard, there would not have been a triangle.”
Reasoning counterfactually: making inferences about things that didn't happen. (2002, methodology): “In our view, therefore, subjunctives are not interpreted as biconditionals (see also Byrne & Tasso, 1999), because subjunctives can be fleshed out to reveal the nonnecessity of the antecedent.”
Counterfactual thinking about actions and failures to act. (2000, background): “…the information hypothesized, and also the presupposed factual situation: As a result of keeping in mind the more explicit representation of the two situations, there are systematic differences in the inferences people make from factual and counterfactual conditionals (Byrne & Tasso, 1999).”
Counterfactual Thought. (2016, background): “For example, they make the modus tollens inference from “There were no lilies” to “Therefore there were no roses” (e.g., Byrne & Tasso 1999).”
Counterfactual and semi-factual thoughts in moral judgements about failed attempts to harm (2017, background): “…because they will think about two possibilities, the facts – Jenny’s partner let go of the metal and was not burned, and an imagined worse alternative – Jenny’s partner did not let go and was burned (e.g., Byrne, 2005; Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Thompson & Byrne, 2002; Santamaria, Espino, & Byrne, 2005).”
Thinking About the Opposite of What Is Said: Counterfactual Conditionals and Symbolic or Alternate Simulations of Negation (2018, methodology): “Of equal importance is the observation that participants make the modus ponens inference from “there were roses,” to “there were orange trees” readily from the counterfactual, just as often as they do from an indicative conditional (e.g., Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Thompson & Byrne, 2002).”
Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. (2002, result): “Such inferences are valid deductions with material implications, but not, as in the present case, with everyday conditionals. Material implications are true if their consequents are true and if the antecedents are false (see Table 2), and so in strengthening the antecedent of a material implication ”
Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations (2006, background): “…caught the train’’, they tend to envisage not only the hypothesised counterfactual situation, in which Jim got up early and caught the train (A and B), but also the presupposed factual situation, in which Jim didn’t get up early and didn’t catch the train (not-A and not-B) (Byrne & Tasso, 1999).”
Anomalies in real and counterfactual worlds : An eye-movement investigation (2008, background): “Counterfactuals are ubiquitous in cognitive activities, ranging from simple imagination beyond reality, and fantasy (e.g., Sternberg & Gastel, 1989) to the exploration of possibilities in deductive reasoning (e.g., Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).”
Counterfactual thinking: The temporal order effect (2004, background): “…Michael picks RED and they WIN John picks BLACK and Michael picks RED and they WIN John picks BLACK and Michael picks BLACK and they LOSE People can keep in mind several possibilities to understand a counterfactual conditional (Byrne & Tasso, 1999; Quelhas & Byrne, 2003; Thompson & Byrne, 2002).”