Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation

By Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter. 2000

300 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ffa435fa54cf0383dc642a8d48d0e85b58fa9ebf

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Citations in the corpus

An Experimental Investigation of the Interactions among Intentions, Reciprocity, and Control (2013, background): “However, a growing body of research suggests that formal controls can negatively affect the attitudes and behavior of employees subjected to the control (e.g., Frey 1993; Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999; Fehr and Gächter 2001; Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Christ et al. 2008; 2012b).”
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006, background): “In experiments on labor contracting, subjects provided less effort when the contract specified fines for inadequate performance than when it did not (Fehr et al., 2001; Fehr and Gächter, 2001) and they behaved much less generously when the principal had simply removed from their choice set the most ”
Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting (2003, background): “Finally, Fehr and Gächter (2001) discuss that their experiment framed the explicit incentives as a penalty and that, if framed as a reward, explicit incentives may not destroy, but actually enhance voluntary cooperation.”
The Importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital (2016, background): “[21] Fehr, Ernst, and Simon Gächter (2000) ’Do incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation?’ Institute for Empirical Research in Economics WP 34, University of Zürich.”
Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity (2000, result): “Further experiments in Fehr et al. (2000) cast, however, doubt on this explanation.”
Reputation, Gossip, and Human Cooperation (2016, background): “For example, punishment may undermine one’s intrinsic motivation to cooperate (Fehr & Gächter, 2001; Nelissen & Mulder, 2013), make people less cooperative or trusting once punishment is removed in future interactions (Mulder, Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006), and create second-order free rider…”
Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment (2010, unknown): “…under certain conditions (Haveman, 1992; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Howard-Grenville, 2005), organizations are resistant to change when managers attempt to impose new routines from above (Feldman, 2003) or when the new routines are not a logical outgrowth of existing routines (Haveman, 1992).”
How to identify trust and reciprocity (2004, background): “2 The research program includes the following papers: Fehr and Falk (1999), Fehr and Gachter (2000a, 2000b) ,”