The Faces of “Market Discipline”

By Mark J. Flannery. 2001

322 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fe08d85b945870c684d7424612eb5012eca30d07

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Citations in the corpus

• Examining the Relationships between Capital, Risk and Efficiency in European Banking (2007, unknown): “With regards to the latter various commentators (e.g., Flannery, 1998, 2001; Benink and Wihlborg, 2003; Sironi, 2003; Gropp et al., 2004) note the importance that market discipline can have on bank risktaking and capital strength.”
• Ownership Structure and Risk in Publicly Held and Privately Owned Banks (2011, background): “On the one hand, the market is expected to monitor or to influence the risk behavior of banks and therefore the impact of ownership changes on risk cannot be assessed without considering incentives driven by financial markets in terms of discipline (Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Flannery, 2001).”
• The extent of disclosure in annual reports of banking companies: The case of India (2008, background): “Finally, market discipline might be able to supplement traditional supervisory assessments to distinguish ‘good’ banks from ‘bad’ ones and therefore, lower the overall social costs of bank supervision (Flannery, 2001).”
• Who Disciplines Bank Managers? (2009, unknown): “While debtholders do not normally acquire direct control rights, they can indirectly influence executive behavior via two distinct avenues (Flannery, 2001): (i) owners and executives understand that risk-enhancing activities impact on the price and quantity of future debt funds (e.g., Morgan and…”
• Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues (2000, unknown): “…new information and in changing their analytical methods whenever needed, while supervisors have a comparative advantage in influencing due to their capacity to access all relevant information and to legally restrict the activities of financially weak banks (De Young et al., 2001, Flannery, 2001).”
• Ownership structure, market discipline, and banks risk-taking incentives under deposit insurance (2011, background): “Hall et al. (2002) explicitly test the effect of deposit insurance reform on the risk sensitivity of average interest paid on uninsured deposits in a cross section of US banks, and find that the risk sensitivity did not significantly increase after 1991.”
• Thoughts on Financial Accounting and the Banking Industry (2014, unknown): “Market discipline can also operate via regulatory intervention triggered by market signals, such as price movements of bank securities (e.g., Stephanou, 2010; Flannery, 2001).”