Ownership structure, market discipline, and banks risk-taking incentives under deposit insurance

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Bank ownership, regulation and efficiency: Perspectives from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region (2017, unknown): “Despite this, deposit insurance creates a moral hazard problem by limiting a bank’s downside risk and encouraging risk-taking (Forssbæck, 2011) with less incentive for insured depositors to monitor bank behavior.”
Risk in Islamic Banking (2012, unknown): “[TABLE V]”
Ownership Structure and Risk-Taking: Comparative Evidence from Private and State-Controlled Banks in China (2014, background): “Some related studies either focus on the nature of the bank (Nichols et al., 5 2009; Barry et al., 2011; Forssbæck, 2011) or on the degree of ownership concentration (Sullivan and Spong, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Iannotta et al., 2013).”