Judgment under Uncertainty
By Camille Morvan, W. J. Jenkins. 2017
551 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In General Decision Sciences
- Gerd Gigerenzer
- Daniel G. Goldstein
- Hansjörg Neth
- Collin Raymond
- Daniele Nosenzo
- Eran Ben-Elia
- Ahmed Ali Abbasi
- Hanna M. Wallach
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Gerd Gigerenzer
- Hansjörg Neth
- Daniel G. Goldstein
- Hanna M. Wallach
- Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
- Collin Raymond
- Daniele Nosenzo
- C. Frey
Citations in the corpus
- Manipulating and Measuring Model Interpretability (2018, background): “Second, when past predictions are visible, they might exert an anchoring effect [26] on subsequent predictions, swaying new predictions in the direction of the past predictions.”
- The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerisation? (2017, background): “Humans, in contrast, must fulfill a range of tasks unrelated to their occupation, such as sleeping, necessitating occasional sacrifices in their occupational performance (Kahneman et al., 1982).”
- The Tyranny of Data? The Bright and Dark Sides of Data-Driven Decision-Making for Social Good (2016, background): “The history of human decision-making – particularly when it comes to questions of power in resource allocation, fairness, justice, and other public goods – is wrought with innumerable examples of extreme bias, leading towards corrupt, inefficient or unjust processes and outcomes [2, 34, 70, 87].”
- Determinants of individual investment decisions in investment-based crowdfunding (2018, unknown): “Heuristics influence investment choices of individuals (Agnew, 2006; Benartzi, 2001) but can also lie at the origin of biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).”
- Leader corruption depends on power and testosterone (2015, background): “Although not a social norm, presenting this option as the “default” engenders a norm of sorts that can be thought of as an anchor point (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); thus, to the extent that individuals decide something different from this anchor point by invoking the antisocial decision as a…”
- Divergence between individual perceptions and objective indicators of tail risks: Evidence from floodplain residents in New York City (2015, unknown): “This behaviour can be explained by an availability bias as shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1973; 1974).2 For example, individuals who have recently experienced a flood may find it easier to imagine that a flood will occur again in the future and, therefore, have a higher perceived likelihood than…”
- Preferences for Truth‐Telling (2016, methodology): “Our strategy to shift beliefs is based on an anchoring procedure (Tversky and Kahneman 1974): we ask subjects to think about the behavior of hypothetical participants in the F_LOW experiment and we anchor them to think about participants who reported the high state more or less often.”
- When should the Ask be a Nudge? The Effect of Default Amounts on Charitable Donations (2016, unknown): “Anchoring has been shown to impact decisions in many contexts (Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2003; Epley and Gilovich, 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), by”
- Anthropomorphism as Cognitive Bias (2017, background): “Intuitive anthropomorphic bias is one kind of cognitive bias that results from reasoning heuristics applied in our unconscious (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974).”
- Big Data Research in Information Systems: Toward an Inclusive Research Agenda (2016, background): “For instance, behavioral economics is a well-established area (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).”
- Confronting Abusive Language Online: A Survey from the Ethical and Human Rights Perspective (2020, background): “Tversky and Kahneman (1974) were the first psychologists that showed how humans employ heuristics to make judgements under uncertainty.”
- Response to Travel Information: A Behavioural Review (2015, background): “Tversky and Kahneman (1974) asked subjects to estimate the number of African member states in the United Nations while the subjects were given the winning number derived from a spinning roulette.”
- Understanding Agency Problems in Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationships in Multinational Corporations: A Contextualized Model (2018, background): “…bounded rationality as consisting of three dimensions: (a) limited information-processing capacities (e.g., Simon, 1957), (b) cognitive economizing (i.e., reliance on mental shortcuts and heuristics; e.g., Simon, 1990), and (c) cognitive biases and errors (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).”
- Moving Opportunism to the Back Seat: Bounded Rationality, Costly Conflict, and Hierarchical Forms (2016, background): “Although heuristics generally assist decision making, they can also lead to large systematic errors in judgment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).”
- On doing better science: From thrill of discovery to policy implications (2017, background): “The key issue here has to do with measurement (Wright, 2016); human judgment, even expert judgment is fallible (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989) and processes information in expectancy-based ways (Fiske, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 5 .”
- Heuristics: Tools for an Uncertain World (2015, methodology): “Despite general acknowledgments that heuristics are “quite useful” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124) and “highly economical and usually effective” (p. 1131), those benefits are typically qualified by emphasizing that heuristics “lead to severe and systematic errors” (p. 1124).”