Knowledge and its Limits

By Keith DeRose. 2002

2,276 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fd633f0dec7177ca9156ba7a0ac5b18b97f59916

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

In Philosophy

Citations in the corpus

Cognitive Penetrability of Perception (2013, background): “…Chisholm 1977; Dretske 1971; Armstrong 1973; Goldman 1979; for a recent collection see: Kornblith 2001); and finally the adequacy of the standard (JTB) account that takes knowledge to be some variant of justified true belief (Gettier 1963; and for a recent alternative to JTB, see Williamson 2000).”
Predicting the presuppositions of soft triggers (2011, background): “…not claimed here that a sentence such as (33) can be ‘factorized’ into its constituent lexical entailments, nor is it assumed that there is a solution to the equation John knows that p ¼ John believes that p ^ p ^ X. (cf. e.g. Williamson 2002; Yablo 2008 etc. on the dangers of such an assumption.)”
Generalizing the Lottery Paradox (2006, background): “For example, knowledge violates the B and 4 schemas, and therefore the 4 schema too, which is equivalent to 4 in the presence of the T schema, which knowledge trivially satisfies (Williamson [2000]). However, on the approach of Williamson ([2000]), known propositions have probability 1 on the eviden”
Rationality’s Fixed Point (or: In Defense of Right Reason) (2015, background): “24 For the sorts of reasons familiar from Williamson (2000).”
The Limits of Self-Awareness (2004, neutral): “21 See Peacocke (1993) and Williamson (1995, 2000).”
Belief Through Thick and Thin (2015, background): “But, for the record, we want to allow that thin, dispositional, unconscious belief suffces to satisfy the belief condition on knowledge.”
Troubles with Truth-making: Necessitation and Projection (2006, background): “(ii) Knowledge is a factive state (Williamson 2000: ch. 2) and no particular piece of knowledge could have been a mere belief (notice that Williamson hesitates to apply his thesis to token states because of some general worries about the idea of such entities; op. cit.”
Why Suspend Judging (2017, background): “See, Olsson and Westlund (2006) for the initial suggestion.”
Does Belief Have an Aim? (2003, background): “16 (Williamson, 2000, pp. 244–249) presents a different but related argument for the conclusion that we can’t explain the amount of evidence required for assertion by supposing that assertion aims at the truth.”
Knowledge (2017, background): “That is a classical philosophical topic; a recent contribution to the old debate is, for instance, Williamson (2000) where many of the classical arguments are discussed and often refuted.”
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2019, background): “Indeed, if Williamson (2000) is correct, then our ability to fully appreciate our evidence is subject to in principle limitations.”
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: a dynamic reference work (2003, background): “This is achieved by a precise mathematical rule that speciﬁes a probabilistic relationship between the dynamical state and possible value states.”
KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY (2008, background): “…paradox, such as (43) and (44), the advocate of the knowledge account of assertion must embrace a contextualist account of knowledge ascriptions, according to which we have “a reluctance to allow the contextually set standards for knowledge and certainty to diverge” (Williamson, 2000, p. 254).”
Anti-luck epistemology (2007, background): “Here I focus on the two classic papers on this topic by Nagel (1976) and Williams (1976), arguing that they motivate an illusory problem regarding moral luck by implicit appeal to a genuine problem regarding reflective epistemic luck.”